WaPo op-ed combats progressive challenge to Obama with affirmative action pleas

@rich wheeler:

It is widely believed that after re-election in 64 he would not have escalated the Asian ground war as L.B.J. did.

Kennedy was in it to win it, appointed Henry Cabot Lodge as Ambassador replacing Nolting who favored mollifying and patiently working with Ngo Dinh Diem as opposed to the tactics Lodge implemented resulting in deeper involvement, or escalation if you prefer.

The Diem coup was one of those critical events in the history of U.S. policy that could have altered our commitment. The choices were there: (1) continue to plod along in a limited fashion with Diem–despite his and Nhu’s growing unpopularity; (2) encourage or tacitly support the overthrow of Diem, taking the risk that the GVN might crumble and/or acommodate to the VC; and (3) grasp the opportunity–with the obvious risks–of the political instability in South Vietnam to disengage. The first option was rejected because of the belief that we could not win with Diem-Nhu. The third was very seriously considered a policy alternative because of the assumption that an independent, non-communist SVN was too important a strategic interest to abandon-and because the situation was not sufficiently drastic to call into question so basic an assumption. The second course was chosen mainly for the reasons the first was rejected-Vietnam was thought too important; we wanted to win; and the rebellious generals seemed to offer that prospect.

It was Robert Kennedy that wanted to disengage and not escalate, not brother John who was calling the shots and responsible for who he appointed to speak on behalf of our country as well as advise him as to what direction we should take.

Lodge was instrumental in allowing the second coup to take place where Diem and his brother were murdered, their government replaced by the military leaders that led the coup, some civilians were also appointed. That government was later found not capable of governing or protecting the people from the expanding VC troops our government failed to take note of before the coup.

Lodge, Kennedy’s guy, his appointee, was in contact with the Vietnamese military leadership from the early stages of the planning and on the day of the coup, with both the military and Diem throughout the hours it was taking place. Also, a CAS officer was allowed to sit in the meeting with the generals when they informed other generals the coup was in the works, the officer relayed information back to our embassy throughout the day.

Almost like must see TV, a president and his advisors sit back and wait for the minute by minute while Vietnam’s leader is assasinated and his government overthrown, all the while knowing the when, where, and how it was all planned. Kind of “hawkish” wouldn’t you say?

31 Oct 1963 Lodge defers departure

Lodge, who had been scheduled to leave for Washington for high-level conferences, defers his departure because of the tense atmosphere and the apparent immenence of the coup.

1 Nov 1963 Lodge and Felt meet with Diem

10:00 a.m. Admiral Felt, who is visiting, and Lodge call on Diem, who reiterates many of the points he made to McNamara a month earlier. At the end of the meeting, Diem takes Lodge aside and indicates he is ready to talk about what the U.S. wants him to do. 8) Felt leaves Saigon after the meeting.

Late morning Coup units begin to deploy

The first coup units begin to deploy in and around Saigon.

12:00 a.m. Officers meet at JGS

The coup committee has convened a meeting of all senior Vietnamese officers except Generals Dinh and Cao at JGS. There they are informed of the coup and asked to support it. All except Colonel Tung do. Their pledges of support are taped. Tung is taken into custody later to be executed. The CNO was killed en route by an escort. A CAS officer is invited to the JGS and maintains telephone contact with the Embassy throughout the coup.

1:45 p.m. U.S. notified

General Don calls General Stillwell, J-3 to General Harkins, and informs him that the coup is under way.

2:00 p.m. Key installations taken

About his time coup forces are seizing the key installations in Saigon, including the post office, police headquarters, radio stations, airport, naval headquarters, etc. They were also deploying for attacks on the palace and the palace guard barracks and to block any counter-attack from outside the city.

4:00 p.m. First skirmishes, Diem told to surrender

By about this time the first skirmish was taking place at the palace and guard barracks. Failing to reach General Dinh, Diem and Nhu realize the coup is serious. The generals called shortly after this and told the two brothers to surrender. They refused.

4:30 p.m. Coup broadcast, Diem calls Lodge

The generals go on radio, announce the coup and demand the resignation of Diem and Nhu. At the same time, Diem is calling Lodge. He asks Lodge where the U.S. stands. Lodge replies that the U.S. cannot yet have a view. He exprsses concern for Diem’s safety, and the conversation ends there.

http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/pent6.htm

ANOTHER ROUND OF INCREASES

After Diem’s fall there was a brief period of optimism based on the expectation that the new military regime in Saigon would be more receptive to U.S. advice than its predecessor had been. By the summer of 1964, when the decision was made to expand the advisory effort again, this optimistic hope had foundered on the fact of continued VC victories and instability within the GVN.

NSAM 288 had, in March 1964, stated U.S. objectives in Vietnam in the most unambiguous and sweeping terms. If there had been doubt that the limited risk gamble undertaken by Eisenhower had been transformed into an unlimited commitment under Kennedy, that doubt should have been dispelled internally by NSAM 288’s statement of objectives:

We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. We do not require that it serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western Alliance. South Vietnam must be free, however, to accept outside assistance as required to maintain its security. This assistance should be able to take the form not only of economic and social measures but also police and military help to root out and control insurgent elements.</em>

If we cannot save South Vietnam, the NSAM continued in a classic statement of the “domino theory,” all of Southeast Asia will probably fall and all of the Western Pacific and South Asian nations will come under increased pressure.

http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/pent11.htm