Accepting Defeat In Ukraine

by MoA

In early November the Economist published an interview and several pieces by the commander in chief of the Ukrainian army, General Zaluzny. As I summarized:

Zaluzny’s central thesis is that the war is currently at a stalemate. It has become positional, with no large maneuvers being possible. He compares it to the war in Europe in 1917. There, he says, a change only happened through the introduction of new technologies (i.e. tanks).
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I for one think that Zaluzny is mistaken. The war is not at a stalemate. Russia has clearly the advantage as it is free to maneuver along the whole frontline and to attack wherever it likes. It does not do so in full force because the current situation allows it to conveniently fulfill the order its commander in chief had given to it – to destroy the military capabilities of Ukraine.

Finally a western mainstream writer has caught up with those facts. Lee Hockstader, the Washington Post‘s columnist for European affairs,  opines:

In Ukraine, the risk isn’t stalemate. It’s defeat.

Hockstader laments the lack of support from the U.S. and Europe for the new demands the Ukraine is making. He states:

Without those infusions of cash, arms and munitions, even the disappointing status quo over the past year, in which Ukraine has not managed to recapture much territory, is unlikely to endure.Andriy Yermak, a top aide to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, told a Washington forum last week that the “big risk” is that Kyiv’s troops could “lose this war.”

That message should jolt policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic. The danger, as Ukraine’s top general warned publicly last month, isn’t simply stalemate. It is that Ukrainian forces, running low on equipment, might be compelled to fall back, shorten their defensive lines and abandon territory.
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It’s essential to think about what Ukraine’s defeat means, because it would be as much a strategic disaster for the United States and its NATO allies as a tableau of terror for Ukraine. Dual cataclysms, equally stark, played out on different timetables.

Well, yes. The West has shot its wad and it proved to be sterile.

There will be no terror for Ukraine, just the loss of the ethnic Russian people, industries and land the communist – Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev – had for whatever reasons attached to it. The rest of it will be a smaller, more poor and purely agricultural rump state without access to the sea. This was obvious from the very beginning to anyone with a clear view of the balance of the forces involved in the war.

As I wrote on February 24 2022, the very day Russian forces entered Ukraine:

Looking at this map I believe that the most advantageous end state for Russia would be the creation of a new independent country, call it Novorussiya, on the land east of the Dnieper and south along the coast that holds a majority ethnic Russian population and that, in 1922, had been attached to the Ukraine by Lenin. That state would be politically, culturally and militarily aligned with Russia.

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This would eliminate Ukrainian access to the Black Sea and create a land bridge towards the Moldavian breakaway Transnistria which is under Russian protection.

Excursus:

The yellow part of that map marked ‘Ukraine in 1654’ was actually the land of the Eastern Orthodox Zaporozhian Cossacks. Under threat from the Catholic Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth, which at the time held the green parts under serfdom, they negotiated the Pereiaslav Agreement (1654) with Russia and pledged allegiance to the Tsar. They area thus became an autonomous part of Russia.

End Excursus

The rest of the Ukraine would be a land confined, mostly agricultural state, disarmed and too poor to be build up to a new threat to Russia anytime soon. Politically it would be dominated by fascists from Galicia which would then become a major problem for the European Union.

Thanks to Stalin’s additions to the Ukraine three countries, Poland, Hungary and Romania, have claims to certain areas in the Ukraine’s western regions. If they want to snatch those up again it is now probably the best time to do so. Despite being part of NATO, which likely would not support such moves, those three will have domestic policy difficulties to withstand the urge.

Since then we learned that Novorussiya will not be an independent state but a genuine part of Russia. So be it. Meanwhile analysts like Hockstader still delve in fantasies:

A complete Ukrainian military collapse is unlikely, at least in coming months. Kyiv’s armed forces remain well-led and motivated, and they are husbanding equipment to prepare for shortfalls. But it is equally unlikely to expect a negotiated cease-fire with Russia that would maintain existing battle lines. To believe in that seemingly anodyne outcome is to misjudge Putin — again.

This is not misjudging Putin, but misjudging the capabilities left to Ukraine. It has run out of men and material. There are daily videos of this or that Ukrainian army unit condemning its leaders and announcing to leave its positions. The potential of a collapse of Ukrainian army is real.

On November 2 I also wrote about the 47th Ukrainian brigade:

During the last days tanks from the 47th brigade (Leo 2) and 10th mountain brigade (T-64BM/BV) have been seen, and were destroyed, near Avdiivka. Both brigades had only recently been mauled during their hopeless attacks at the southern front. It does not make sense to throw what is left of them into another battle without reconstituting them. The whole experience and knowledge these brigades had gained will be lost with them.

Yesterday, the Ukraine friendly Military Watch Magazine confirmed my opinion:

Ukraine’s Elite 47th Mechanised Brigade Surrounded and Low on Ammunition: Critical Front Faces Collapse

The Ukrainian Army’s elite 47th Mechanised Brigade stationed in the town of Avdiivka in the disputed Donetsk region has been surrounded and forced to contend with growing ammunition shortages, according to multiple reports from Ukrainian and Western sources. British reports indicate that the brigade was meant to attack a Russian column before it linked up with assault infantry on the northern flank of Avdievka, but failed to do so due to a lack of ammunition. The brigade’s efforts to stop the advance of Russian forces in Avdievka were described by The Times as “desperate,” fuelling perceptions of an “inevitable collapse” of Ukrainian positions, and diminished hope of preventing a Russian victory by the beginning of the New Year holidays.
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A serviceman from the 47th Brigade, cited only as Sergeant Danylo, observing when interviewed over the past week “a shitty situation” as the shell shortage forced soldiers to make impossible life-and-death decisions.“We had 10 times more ammunition over summer, and better quality… American rounds come in batches of almost identical weights, which makes it easier to correct fire, with very few duds. Now we have shells from all over the world with different qualities, and we only get 15 for three days. Last week we got a batch full of duds.” Thus instead of firing on Russians as soon as they came within range, Ukrainian personnel increasingly had to wait to be sure the Russians were heading for their positions and to only engage large groups. Munitions produced by European states have very frequently been faulted for their quality, and at times been considered near useless, with Italian equipment being particularly notorious for its poor quality, in contrast to superior equipment either inherited from the Soviet era or produced in by the United States.

Now tell me again that these are “well-led and motivated” forces which are “husbanding equipment to prepare for shortfalls”. Neither rings true to me.

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