BETRAYAL! Obama Terminates Missile Defense Agreements with Poland and Czech Republic

This is a move reminiscent of Jimmy Carter’s give-away of the Panama Canal. It is a gesture intended to foment goodwill but will not while something of great value will have been given away for nothing in return. Russia and others will continue to trade or sell technology to belligerent countries and we will be left with fewer options at our disposal to mitigate threats in an increasingly dangerous world.

For the sake of appeasing Russian pride on the subject of influence in Eastern Europe, and that is all this is since the missile defense system would have posed no strategic threat to the Kremlin’s ability to wage nuclear war, the Obama administration has signaled to the world that it is not willing to continue to provide security for it’s allies.

Possibly worse, Iran’s continued development of nuclear weapons technology does not have a counter other than a preemptive or retaliatory strike. Depending on the final composition and disposition of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, the current systems alluded to in the WaPo article as a “shorter-range, sea-based system”, could be wholly ineffective. Those systems are viable, to a degree, against North Korean missiles because of unique geographical advantages not present in the Iranian scenario.

I don’t apply this next comment to Poland as much as I would for Japan and Taiwan, but countries that have benefited from the U.S. defensive umbrella in the past should probably consider embarking on independent nuclear programs of their in the face of an American retreat under Russian pressure. If America won’t stand by allies in Europe, what will it do for Taiwan, Japan, or others? Some may well explore an independent nuclear program and can be added to the growing list of nuclear capable countries while we degrade our ability to defend against such a threat.

Having a missile defense capability would give the President a valuable tool to deter Iranian threats against the United States and Europe. Without that capability the opportunity to drive a wedge between America and Europe through the intimidation of nuclear tipped ballistic missiles has never been greater. This move will ultimately weaken political unity across the Atlantic.

We’ve seen in the past that when the United States retreats from its role as a counterweight to aggression it will not be long before we see the waters tested again. Back down from the Russians, back down from the Iranians, and it won’t be long before they seek to push the margins again. How long before Huge Chavez becomes emboldened enough to make that final reckless miscalculation?

This was an ill-advised move on the part of the Obama administration. If it was never his intent to deploy the system, he could have certainly stalled for the time needed to provide a replacement or could have sought to use the cancellation to earn bigger concessions from Russia. In true Jimmy Carter style, Obama has cast the country in retreat and will certainly tempt those that seek to test our limits.

Actually this reminds me more of the SALT II treaty that Carter forced the US to sign even though he was informed that the Soviets had already broken the treaty before it was even signed.

I would agree that things like this will DRIVE nuclear proliferation – NOT end it or limit it. If I were a Japan or Korea or Israel (though they already have it), figuring that the USA won’t be helping me, I’d have to come up with my own plan.

Obama’s doing exactly what he said he’d do. This is just the latest of several indicators that the foreign policy of the United States is fundamentally shifting from a position of confrontation to a position of accommodation. From the kissing up to Chavez, to the support of Zelaya in Honduras Obama is the lead participant in the attempt to reshape global political systems from potpourri to a leftist one-size-fits-all system.

LINK

It gets worse.

Not only has Obama screwed the Poles and the Czechs, but he’s backstabbed the Georgins as well.

I keep thinking, Red Dawn, Russia is not someone to take lightly.

http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=ZDY3ZmZmNDRjOTAyZTVkNmE5ZTExYzdhM2YxM2QwMjg=

Obama has not shelved the missile defense plan. He simply wants to put it on board US navy ships, which can be moved close to Iran.

To understand the bitterness in Poland, 70 years ago today, the headline in the New York Times read “Russians Drive 40 Miles Into Poland, Defense Weak; Polish President In Rumania, Warsaw Holding Out; Britain and France, Concerned, Consult On Action.
The utter insensitivity to the date is amazing.
So much for “Smart Diplomacy”.

Re explain that to Poland and Czech.

You are under the impression that having US anti-missile bases in Poland and Czech were popular in Poland and Czech? Not true. The two governments were unable to get the plan through their legislatures.

Are you saying that having US anti-missiles on US Navy ships will not protect Poland and Czech (and France and Germany as well) against missiles launched from Iran. Pat Buchanan, the conservative columnist, pointed out tonight that having US missiles on ships would probably do a much better job of protecting Israel against Iran missiles, than having the capability based in Poland. Moreover, putting the capability on ships means that it can be deployed much faster than the Poland-Czech plan.

Finally, Europe is rich. If it feels that it needs anti-missiles to protect it against Russia, then it can build or buy its own anti-missiles. Ours will be there on ships to protect it if necessary, but it it feels that it needs more anti-missiles, and that they should be based on land in Europe, it can afford the price.

Re the insensitivity to the date. On that we agree.

@tfhr: Thanks! You saved me the trouble of responding and I wholeheartedly concur with every point listed!

@Robin Lennon:

No problem but your link does not seem to work.

You can also add that positioning ships close enough to Iran would make them more vulnerable to attack by Iranian forces using swarm tactics, mines, submarines, anti-ship cruise missiles and just about any other means they might consider. Placing ships close enough to be effective against an Iranian launch pushes both countries that much closer to pulling the trigger as the Iranians would no doubt consider a serious deployment as a provocation.

The whole thing is just a stupid idea that was most likely moved up to the date it was actually announced for the single purpose of knocking down the ACORN embarrassment to whatever extent possible. Why else on earth would you pick the anniversary of the very day that Poland was invaded by the Soviet Union to tell Warsaw, “Sorry, but we can’t be there for you” and the other European sacrificial lamb of WWII, Prague, “It’s time for ‘Appeasement in Our Time'”?

If I only could convince myself that this administration was not capable of doing worse, I might be able to sit for another three years with some worry but I know they’re only just getting started and I am very concerned about the next miscalculation.

Your points on the vulnerabilty of ships are valid, but the Navy knows about them and is taking steps to overcome them. Note that William Gates, the Republican appointee of George Bush who is Secretary of Defense to Obama, has approved this.

The original decision was made on the assumption that the missiles that Iran would devolop would be long-range missiles, which go very high. The latest research indicates that Iran is a long way from this, and is likely to only have short- and medium-range missiles for the immediate future. If Iran comes close to developing long-range missiles, the plan can be modified. However, Gates says, and i believe him, that the ship-based anti-missile defense is better for short-range and medium-range missiles.

And, of course, it is much more flexible. The same ships can be used anywhere in the world. If China wants to take on Taiwan, the same ships can be used. To be sure, having LOTs of ship-based anti-ballistic missiles will be expensive, but perhaps not as expensive as LOTs of foreign bases.

@smrstrauss:

You are so misinformed I almost don’t know where to start.

Let’s talk some about the technical aspects of the problem. The technology that allows the missiles launched from an Aegis equipped surface ship is the same for Patriot, Arrow and all other anti-ballistic missiles that use kinetic energy to destroy their targets. If an ABM uses a proximity fused warhead, so much the better but it will still rely on critical components in the process such as phased array radars, data links, kinetic kill vehicles, sensors, etc., of which there are commonalities amongst ABMs. These things have been around for more than two decades and are steadily improving with time due to advances in software, sensors, propulsion, communications and miniaturization.

The difference that you don’t seem to appreciate is when the interception takes place. If the missile is being engaged in the boost phase, it is an endo-atmospheric intercept. This is the best time because the missile is at it’s lowest performance aspects, more likely to be over territory not of your own, and most easily located with IR sensors in addition to radar. The ballistic missile’s warhead and additional stages are still together presenting a larger more vulnerable target, the engine is burning at it’s hottest, yet it moving slower than at other times along the flight path. This is a good time for a smaller, shorter range ABM like those capable of being launched from a ship or aircraft to be put to the task.

The problem is that the opportunity to engage that missile in the boost phase is very limited by both time and geography. The total time of flight of a missile launched from inside Russia might last about 30 minutes but the boost phase is probably limited to about 300 seconds. The likely launch locations of Russian ICBMs all but precludes any opportunity to target them during the first few minutes, the boost phase. The first real opportunity to engage Russian missiles directed at the United States would be exo-atmospheric. That period might last around 25 minutes or so to be followed by the reentry of the warhead, representing the last chance. An Iranian ICBM would present a similar profile if launched at the United States

To engage that same missile further along the flight path presents a more difficult challenge and requires an interceptor with greater range and performance but this had already been done as far back as June 1984 using a highly modified Minuteman ICBM. Your snarky comment that the “poor things do not work” reveals a level of ignorance of the subject matter that is certainly of no surprise but also a sickening attitude that is first dismissive of tremendous technical accomplishments by those engaged in defending Americans from future ballistic missile threats and second, a level of frivolous disregard for the potential of systems like mid-course interceptors to deter threat nations from pursuing developmental programs now and in the
future.

To further disspell you of the myth that mid-course interceptions are not possible, please read the following:

ST. LOUIS, Sept. 28, 2007 — The Boeing Company [NYSE: BA], working with industry teammates and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, successfully completed a missile defense flight test today that resulted in the intercept of a target warhead and demonstrated the capability and reliability of the nation’s only defense against long-range ballistic missiles.

The test, GMD’s seventh intercept overall, was the second intercept with an operationally configured interceptor since September 2006.

Feel free to read more about it at http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/space/gmd/news/2007/q3/070928c_nr.html

Much of the tap dancing on this issue centers on claims that the Iranians are far from developing an ICBM capable of hitting the United States. That may be true today but what about 2011 or any other imaginable date in the next five years? What guarantee can you give us here, right now, that if Iran does develop or acquire a missile that falls just short of ranging targets in the continental United States that Hugo Chavez will never buy a play set of his own from Tehran? Is it sound policy to wait until the threat is realized before measures are taken to mitigate it? Do you think it is a good idea to advertise a vulnerability and an unwillingness to correct it in a world where history repeatedly shows that miscalculations by attackers and the attacked, lead to devastating losses?

The technology has existed for more than 25 years to perform an exo-atmospheric intercept but the political will to refine and deploy that technology in the defense of the United States has been successfully broken time and time again. During this time we have seen more and more nations acquire the means to deliver dangerous payloads to distant targets while we’ve done nearly nothing to protect our own country.

Mid-course interceptions – the first real opportunity to engage Soviet/Russian ICBMs and the likeliest opportunity to intercept Iranian missiles targeting the United States – has been a controversial point not just because of the technical challenges involved but because this did threaten to weaken Moscow’s nuclear option depending on the degree and locations to which it would be deployed.

To engage the missile and war heads upon reentry is the most difficult. Decoys can still be deployed as in the mid-course phase, flight patterns can become erratic, missiles break apart creating clouds of possible targets, warheads may maneuver independently, and worst of all, the amount of time to engage the target will almost certainly be less than two minutes. Couple the uncertainty of locating and hitting the target with the certitude that if it is engaged, it will be done so over friendly territory.

Your choices are:

A. Engage the missile during the boost phase if you are sufficiently forewarned, as with North Korea, and able to get your interceptors close enough to the flight path for the first two or three minutes of the launch. North Korea uses the multi-stage, liquid fueled Taepodong and geography favors a sea based intercept attempt.

B. Engage the missile during mid-course. Launch detection will start the process but the time of flight is significantly longer. If a missile were to have been unsuccessfully engaged during the boost phase, more attempts could be made at this point before the missile and warhead began reentry over friendly territory.

C. Rely on point defenses but accept that wreckage and warheads will likely fall on friendly territory. Also accept that if point defenses are destroyed or rendered inoperable during the first strike, all subsequent missiles delivered against that target will be uncontested.

D. All of the above. A layered, integrated defense combining opportunities to engage an enemy missile throughout it’s flight profile maximized the likelihood of a successful interception.

E. Pre-emptive strike. If a threat nation puts it’s missile forces on alert or displays actions associated with pre-launch activity such as deploying mobile missile systems, use of specialized meteorological sensors, warhead transfers and/or mating, dispersal of national command authority, etc., then our own national command authority, namely the President, SECDEF, JCS, etc., will have to make a decision based largely on the number of observed indicators listed above. Is the threat country preparing to launch a first strike? How many options does the President have at his disposal at that exact moment? One Aegis equipped ship bobbing in sea state 6 conditions in the Mediterranean, Baltic or Black Seas is not the best we can do but it would push the President closer to having to consider a preemptive strike to deter a launch.

Why trade away options for deterrence when you do not have to? If you do decide to cancel a valuable program, shouldn’t you at least get something of value in return? I don’t deny the controversy inherent in deploying such a system in Poland. The controversy will also exist with a Black Sea or Baltic deployment of Aegis equipped ships as well if the Russians choose to make it an issue. Why not use the Ground Based Interceptor deployment as a bargaining chip to persuade the Russians from selling nuclear technology and more advance weapons to Iran and Venezuela?

You mentioned some other points in comment #27 that I address here:

Please be specific with your claim that the USN ” knows about [vulnerabilities] and is taking steps to overcome them.”

Gates also recommended the GBI deployment in the first place, correct? He has backed the Poland deployment as well as the GBIs at Fort Greeley, Alaska. He has a new boss now.

“Lots of foreign bases”? Two does not constitute a “a lot” in my book but having two or three ships to maintain a rotation to cover a single station in the Eastern Med, Black Sea, Baltic Sea, Taiwan, North Korea, AND maintain adequate Aegis coverage of fleet operations around the globe, including the protection of aircraft carriers and other surface ships and strategic targets, is ” a lot” and is very expensive.

I believe an opportunity was missed here and I think we are more vulnerable for it.

Thought I had deleted comment #30 when I incorporated it into comment#29. Sorry for the redundancy.

Re: “The controversy will also exist with a Black Sea or Baltic deployment of Aegis equipped ships…”

Yes, but the Mediterranean would be fine, and probably work just as well against Iran. There would only be need to deploy in the Black Sea when Russia became a real threat, meaning that fighting was expected to be imminent.

This is not a political question. It is a simple question of whether something works or not. IF anti-ballistic missiles that could handle long-range missiles worked, I’d be in favor.

In this discussion so far we have forgotten that missiles can be launched from submarines. In other words, if the ABMs that could handle the long-range missiles did work, the other side would hit the bases of those missiles with submarine launched cruise and ballistic missiles.

What works is nuclear deterrence.

However, I am willing to say that ABMs may work to some extent against short-range and medium range missiles, and for sure against states that cannot launch missiles from submarines.

By the way, we have not discussed the possiblity of putting ABMs on submarines. That would be a good safe place for them, and a flexible way of responding to crises. And we have lots of them.

Re: Please be specific with your claim that the USN ” knows about [vulnerabilities] and is taking steps to overcome them.”

My general point on this was that the anti-ballistic missile ships (and submarines too, I suppose) do not have to be within 10 or 20 miles of Iran. They can be further away and still do a good job, so the attacks by small boats would be difficult. Attacks by cruise missiles continues to be a threat, of course, but that has always been the case.

@smrstrauss: Every question is a political question and this more so than others. Put aside the effectiveness of the current system and look at the damage done to our relations with the Poles, Czechs and Ukrainians.

There is every reason to believe that once the system was deployed, any kinks would be worked out. That’s been the case with every large weapons system.

But if you want to focus on effectiveness and cost I refer you to the February 2009 CBO report:

http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doc10013/02-27-MissileDefense.pdf

According to them, it’s the best system available for the cost.

Cliff Notes version of that 85 page report can be found:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204518504574420790506939498.html

The Bush-era plan is the best in a series of realistic alternatives for protecting not only our troops and international partners, but the U.S. homeland as well. That’s the conclusion of a study released this past February by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). According to that report, “Options for Deploying Missile Defenses in Europe,” the previous administration’s Poland/Czech plan is preferable to sea-based missile defenses situated around Europe; to mobile midcourse defenses deployed at U.S. bases in Germany and Turkey; and to fast, forward-positioned Kinetic Energy Interceptors (missiles designed to neutralize enemy missiles earlier in flight) located at U.S. bases in Germany and Turkey.

One of those three is no longer an option. Earlier this year, the Obama administration canceled the Kinetic Energy Interceptor project as part of its $1.4 billion in cuts to the Pentagon’s missile-defense budget.

It is an undeniable fact that Obama and the Dems are out to cut missile defense at a time when the proliferation of missile technology would indicate the opposite approach is the wiser course.

What a sad day for this country when we send the green light to rogue states like Iran and North Korea.

Re the damage to our relations. The Poles do not want a US missile defense in Poland. There have been polls of the Poles showing that.

To be sure, the CBO study said that the Poland-Czech bases were best for protection against an Iranian long-range ABM. They did not say that they would be good at all against Russian missiles. (And that is what you keep saying the real reason for the thing is.)

If there were a treat from Russia, having anti-missile defenses in Poland would simply mean that Poland was much more of a target to Russia. So, since the current threat is not Russia, it is Iran, it makes sense to put the missiles where the threat is. If Europe thinks that Russia is poising a missile threat, it is rich enough to build or buy its own missiles. I’d be glad to sell them US missiles, or they could build their own.

NO discussion so far of the idea of having ABMs aboard submarines.

@Mike’s America:

I’ve found them to be a good source on many occasions and I frequently browse their websites.

You don’t have to be a rocket scientist to understand the details of this issue but it helps to be able to read. So much of the argument intended to promote this change in national security policy and our relationship with NATO partners is built on the most specious claims and presumptions.

@smrstrauss: So you are saying we need to start conducing foreign policy according to polls?

O.K… then perhaps we should also conduct domestic policy by polls. Since a majority opposes Obama’s health care plan we should scrap it right?

If this was such a bad thing for the Poles and Czechs why are they complaining so much about our betrayal?

Stop spinning before you fall down Strauss.

This is a disaster for U.S. foreign policy, for seeking help from our allies on the tough issues and for demonstrating strength to our rivals and enemies.

It makes us weaker throughout the world.

Sorry smrstrauss…U. B. Wrong.

I will grant you that prior to Russia’s invasion, the support was not as strong, and in SOME polls it was not at all. Poland has it’s liberal media poisoning minds over there, too. Funny how a little thing like an invasion focus’s the mind.

Poles swing to support US missile shield

DPA/Expatica

Why would we expect him to keep our word to Poland? Here goes our nuclear arsonal, Pentagon’s first draft of the nuclear posture review was…..to timid. He’s called for a range of far more reaching options that include:

• Reconfiguring the US nuclear force to allow for an arsenal measured in hundreds rather than thousands of deployed strategic warheads.

• Redrafting nuclear doctrine to narrow the range of conditions under which the US would use nuclear weapons.

• Exploring ways of guaranteeing the future reliability of nuclear weapons without testing or producing a new generation of warheads.

The manchild is getting stupid with power……..and possessive with HIS toys:

But one official said: “Obama is now driving this process. He is saying these are the president’s weapons, and he wants to look again at the doctrine and their role.”

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/20/barack-obama-us-nuclear-weapons