GARY SHILLING: Here’s Why There’s No Housing Recovery And Prices Will Collapse Another 20%

Spread the love

Loading

Everyone thinks the housing market in the U.S. looks like it’s starting to bottom.

Famed economist Gary Shilling is not one of them—you could call him notably bearish on housing.

In fact, he expects prices to drop another 20 percent from here and doesn’t think we will see a bottom in the market for another several years.

The main reasons Shilling is so pessimistic: There is a huge supply of excess inventory not being accounted for, and prices still have not fallen to anywhere near long-term historical averages.

In his monthly INSIGHT client newsletter, Shilling outlined his bearish housing thesis and used several charts to illustrate why he thinks there is no bottom in sight for the U.S. housing market, and more pain is ahead for American homeowners.

Note: Thanks to Gary Shilling for giving us permission to feature his charts.

Continue reading/viewing charts at the Business Insider

0 0 votes
Article Rating
Subscribe
Notify of
11 Comments
Inline Feedbacks
View all comments

I watched his partner Chip Case this AM on a financial news channel.
Same story.
How can the housing market hit bottom IF Obama, the Fed, others keep propping it up and preventing that?
And the volume of housing is still way too low.
I have seen newer owners here really upset about being upside-down, but since they LIVE here and are not planning on selling, I don’t understand their anger.
We bought so long ago that, even if we sold today, we would be plenty of money ahead.
But our situation is fairly rare.

While helicopter Ben continues to fatten his banker friends’ bonuses with free dollars, there is also government artificial support of the real estate market through the ‘easing’ of financial hardship endured by past borrowers.

ANY artificial involvement and interference in the market by the government with taxpayer money, only delays the inevitable – very temporarily. Taxpayer money cannot and will not bailout underwater mortgages – that is the very definition of ‘impossibility’. Only a few will win that lottery. The rest are awaiting reality which will be a long slog through years of depression.

Of course this is all assuming China doesn’t threaten to do what it is threatening with Japan. Then, the process would simply become accelerated.

Are we reading about this in the MSM? . . . Not much.

Shilling is right about the overwhelming, but unrecorded empty and available inventory – inventory which will not be sold for many years. Too many empty homes exist, even almost new ones, which are located where no jobs will be created.

The city of Maricopa had large numbers of homes not being offered because to do so would drive prices down further. Last I heard that is still the case.

Here’s what I don’t understand:
You buy a house.
Your payments are $500.00 a month.
You budget for that. You can afford it.
The value of your house drops. You now owe more than it’s worth.
Your payments are still $500.00 a month.
You’ve budgeted for that. You can afford it.
SO WHAT’S THE FREAKING PROBLEM?

Now, if you bought the house with one of those idiot interest-only-for-five-year loans because you thought that you could sell it for a nice profit before the payments tripled, well, you’ve got a problem.
You gambled on home prices continuing to rise until you sold.
You lost.
You gambled. You lost. Why should my tax dollars cover your gambling losses?

Outstanding/informative thread and comments.

I do have a comment on this:

There is ample room for blame for Congress, regulators, lenders and borrowers alike. What makes me angry is seeing everyone defend uneducated borrowers as victims, who got themselves into subprime loans when they could have qualified for prime. This is as asinine as calling a person, who overpaid for a car because they didn’t shop around, a victim.

Shopping for a home loan is an order of magnitude more complicated than shopping for a car. Everyone knows how to do the latter; it’s something that most people have to do at least every few years. Shopping for a home is often a once in a lifetime proposition. And comparing costs and prices involves a lot more than reading the Auto Trader ads. Sure, you can find where people are advertising low rates. But you have to sit down with the mortgage broker, submit your financials, and then wait until he presents you with a “personalized” loan package.

Remember, these guys and gals were working on commissions. No loan/No commission. The best loan for most people would be a 30 or 15 year fixed, at the lowest interest rate. But, for lots and lots of people, the payments would have been much higher, at first, than in the case of adjustable rate mortgages, which were offered in a dizzying array of structures. Fixed teaser rates, followed by markedly increased rates, down the road. Or fixed teaser rates, followed by a balloon payment. But the mortgage brokers want to sell you these loans. So they say, “don’t worry, by then your property will have appreciated and you’ll easily be able to refinance, at a fixed rate loan, if you like, and you’ll probably be making more money at the time.”

The problem was the securitized mortgages. When we bought our home, in 1979, our original mortgage was sold, held, and serviced by the same entity, Security Pacific Bank. So there was an incentive for the loan officer to make certain that we were credit worthy, because the bank would be stuck with the bad loan, if we weren’t. Through the years, our mortgage did get sold, every few years, to some other entity. But the entire mortgage was sold, intact, and the mortgage seller was responsible to the mortgage buyer for selling good mortgages.

With securitized mortgages, a small piece of our loan is then held by a thousand different entities. Shared risk, but with shared risk comes diminished incentive for due diligence, when the mortgage broker is transformed from a gatekeeper, who weeds out unqualified borrowers, into a commissioned salesperson, who is rewarded for selling the most lucrative form of loan but who has no skin in the game, when the loan goes bad. The perfect storm came with the capital glut of the early 21st century. Too much money chasing too few attractive investment opportunities — which markedly increased the demand for securitized mortgages, leading to a situation where there was too much incentive to make the loan with the highest yield and too little incentive to make the loan with the highest degree of safety.

I do agree with you, however, that certain borrowers should have known better. Those were all the people who jumped into the buy-the-property-and-flip-it game and got in over their heads.

P.S. What do you think of the (improved) housing start situation? It would seem that these are the most sophisticated real estate market forecasters around (the builders and those who lend to the builders), and they are betting with their own money, and not just making armchair predictions.

– Larry Weisenthal/Huntington Beach CA

Larry and Mata Excellent discussion. I was a mortgage banker/broker in Irvine (ground zero) from 98-07. Plenty of blame to go around.
Note It’s 7/1 arm.

Hi Mata,

I think that I have been consistent, but I don’t want to squabble about that. The two of us have already wasted too much of our respective spare time going around and around and, in the end, going nowhere.

What I’d like to do, if you and Wheels are willing, is to use our combined insights and experience to do what academics and politicians have failed to do, which is to come up with a mutually agreed upon and cogent explanation for the financial crisis of 2008. The problem is that both the politicians and academics (who include key Federal Reserve economists — most specifically Greenspan) all have personal skin in this game — either partisan politics, previous economic statements which failed to anticipate the house of cards leading to the financial collapse, or, in the case of Greenspan and the politicians, direct culpability.

I’d ask if we can approach this from the point of collegiality — trying to come up with an essential “truth,” as opposed to starting out with the premise that we are lawyers for our respective political constituencies (“clients”), and we are digging for data or opinions that support our clients and attack the opposing side. This needn’t be as large of an exercise as it might appear.

I think that the essential facts are nicely summarized in a remarkably clear, cogent, and mercifully brief (well, 60 or so pages) retrospective analysis prepared by Greenspan himself:

I intentionally offer up this analysis/summary, from among the several good ones which are available, because many people (including me) put most of the blame on Greenspan, and because Greenspan’s analysis (linked above) is trying to lay out the conservative “case” that it was the political mandates and pressure to expand the affordable housing market which were the central cause of the financial meltdown (note that this doesn’t include the CRA, per se, which absolutely no one blames as having any sort of a meaningful role, saved for uninformed amateur web bloggers).

Anyway, Greenspan lays out the data, and Greenspan argues this from the conservative point of view; so I’ll present Greenspan’s document as the template for discussion.

In all the 60 some odd pages, the following passage is what I find most directly relevant. I’ll start out by simply quoting it, then, in a day or two, I’ll provide my own points of view regarding these data:

Below are Greenspan’s own words, from the above-linked document:

Subprime mortgages in the United States for years had been a small appendage to the broader U.S. home mortgage market, comprising only 7% of total originations as recently as 2002. Most such loans were fixed-rate mortgages, and only a modest amount had been securitized. With the price of homes having risen at a quickening pace since 1997 (exhibit 3), such subprime lending was seen as increasingly profitable to investors. Belatedly drawn to this market, financial firms, starting in late 2003, began to accelerate the pooling and packaging of subprime home mortgages into securities (exhibit 4). The firms clearly had found receptive buyers. Both domestic and foreign investors,largely European, were drawn to the above average yield on these securities and a foreclosure rate on the underlying mortgages that had been in decline for two years.

Another factor contributing to the surge in demand was the heavy purchases of subprime securities by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the major U.S. Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE). Pressed by the Department of Housing and Urban Developmen and the Congress to expand “affordable housing commitments,” they chose to meet them by investing heavily in subprime securities. The firms accounted for an estimated 40% of all subprime mortgage securities (almost all adjustable rate), newly purchased, and retained on investors’ balance sheets during 2003 and 2004 (exhibit 5).

That was an estimated five times their share of newly purchased and retained in 2002, implying that a significant proportion of the increased demand for subprime mortgage backed securities during the years 2003-2004 was effectively politically mandated, and hence driven by highly inelastic demand. By the first quarter of 2007, virtually all subprime originations were being securitized, (compared with only half in 2000,) and subprime mortgage securities outstanding totaled more than $900 billion, a rise of more than six-fold since the end of 2001.The securitizers, profitably packaging this new source of paper into mortgage pools and armed with what turned out, in retrospect, to be grossly inflated credit ratings, were able to sell seemingly unlimited amounts of subprime mortgage securities into what appeared to be a vast and receptive global market. As loan underwriting standards rapidly deteriorated, subprime mortgage originations swelled by 2005 and 2006 to a bubbly 20% of all U.S. home mortgage originations, almost triple their share in 2002.

(We at the Federal Reserve were aware as early as 2000 of incidents of some highly irregular subprime mortgage underwriting practices. But regrettably we viewed it as a localized problem subject to standard prudential oversight, not the precursor of the securitized subprime mortgage bubble that was to arise several years later.)

Again, I’ll provide my own interpretation of the same factual data in a day or so.

– Larry Weisenthal/Huntington Beach CA