Big Brobama

Sorry for my day-long absence, but I had to work today.

@sandormatyo:

The lie was that Saddam had WMDs and was prepared to use them

The Bush Administration relied upon flawed intell, provided by the CIA which, at the time, never let on that there was an inadequacy of intell sources. They actually gave the impression that they had substantial knowledge of what was happening within Iraq.

Saddam himself perpetuated the belief that he possessed wmd; all evidence at the time and his behavior, his muderous history, his constant defiance of UN Resolutions and cat-and-mouse with UNSCOM weapons inspectors, his open-love of wmd acquisition, pointed to the logical conclusion that Saddam was a wmd threat.

There’s a strong distinction between a “lie” and a “mistake”, btw.

The Iraq Survey Group found that Saddam Hussein retained both the intention and the capability to revive bio-chemical weapons programs after sanctions ended (and it seems likely that would have happened).

And the story isn’t fully writ on the final word on wmd.

(”smoking gun, mushroom cloud”; “unmanned drones able to deliver nuclear nuclear weapons to the USA within 45 minutes of launch, etc”).

The partisan Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Phase II investigation says in much of the report, “substantiated by the intelligence”:

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Conclusions

(U) Conclusion 5: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense regarding Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction were generally substantiated by intelligence information, though many statements made regarding ongoing production prior to late 2002 reflected a higher level of certainty than the intelligence judgments themselves. Many senior policymaker statements in early and mid-2002 claimed that there was no doubt that the Iraqi government possessed or was producing weapons of mass destruction. While the intelligence community assessed at this time that the Iraqi regime possessed some chemical and biological munitions, most reports produced prior to fall 2002 cited intelligence gaps regarding production and expressed room for doubt about whether production was ongoing. Prior to late 2002, the intelligence community did not collectively assess with any certainty that Iraq was actively producing any weapons of mass destruction.

Amendment 85 – strike generally and strike everything after information

Comment – We disagree with the use of the term “generally,” because all of the statements were substantiated by the intelligence. Furthermore, the lack of identifying information about exactly which policymakers’ statements were viewed by the authors as reflecting a higher degree of certainty than the intelligence judgments makes it impossible for us to challenge the assertion (which we believe we could if the specific statements were identified). The conclusion is incorrect in asserting that there were “many statements regarding ongoing production prior to late 2002.” This is simply false. None of the statements from this time period mentioned ongoing production at all. It is also false to state that “many senior policymaker statements in early and mid-2002 claimed that there was no doubt” about Iraq’s possession of WMD. Only one policymaker used the term “no doubt” during this time period and it was in August 2002, not early 2002. This type of careless review certainly will be noticed by the readers of the report and harms the credibility of the Committee. We disagree with the comment that prior to 2002 the intelligence community “expressed room for doubt” about whether Iraq possessed chemical and biological munitions and believe, even if it were true, assessments prior to 2002 are irrelevant to what policymakers said in late 2002. We also disagree with including the comment that the intelligence community did not “collectively” assess that Iraq was actively producing any WMD. Whether the intelligence community had a “collective” judgment is irrelevant. The task of this report is not to look at only collective judgments; it is to examine available intelligence.

DELIVERY

Conclusions

(U) Conclusion 7: Statements in the major speeches and additional statements analyzed regarding Iraqi ballistic missiles were generally substantiated by available intelligence. The intelligence community was consistent in its judgments that the Iraqi military possessed a small number of Scud-type missiles left over from the Gulf War era (although the October 2002 NIE noted that these judgments were based on accounting gaps rather than direct evidence), and that Iraq was developing short-range missiles whose range exceeded the range permitted under UN sanctions by as much as 150 km, or 93 miles. The community also judged that Iraq was pursuing the capability to build longer-range missiles, but assessed that this project was still at the early stages of development.

Amendment 96 – strike generally;

strike but did not convey the substantial disagreements or evolving views that existed in the intelligence community. The majority view of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate judged that Iraq had a UAV program that was intended to deliver biological warfare agents. Air Force intelligence dissented from this view, and argued that the new VA V was probably being developed for reconnaissance. The majority view of the January 2003 NIE said merely that Iraq might be modifying UAVs for chemical or biological weapons, and the Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency argued that the evidence for this was unpersuasive. and insert All intelligence agencies assessed that Iraq’s UAVs could be used for CBW delivery. Comments – Again, we disagree with the terms “generally” and we disagree that there was any disagreement within the intelligence community about whether the UAVs “could” be used to deliver CBW as the conclusion states. All agencies agreed that the UAVs could be used to deliver CBW, which is all that policymakers said. We further note that the Air Force dissent on the intended use of the UAVs was not included in the President’s summary of the NIE.

(U) Conclusion 8: Statements by the President, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State that Iraq was developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that could be used to deliver chemical or biological weapons were generally substantiated by intelligence information, but did not convey the substantial disagreements or evolving views that existed in the intelligence community. The majority view of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate judged that Iraq had a UAV program that was intended to deliver biological warfare agents. Air Force intelligence dissented from this view, and argued that the new DAV was probably being developed for reconnaissance. The majority view of the January 2003 NIE said that Iraq “may” be modifying UAVs for chemical or biological weapons, and the Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency argued that the evidence for this was “not sufficiently compelling to indicate that the Iraqis have done so.”

(U) Conclusion 9: The President’s suggestion that the Iraqi government was considering using UAVs to attack the United States was substantiated by intelligence judgments available at the time, but these judgments were revised a few months later, in January 2003. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate noted that an Iraqi procurement network had attempted to purchase commercial mapping software that included data on the United States, and said that this suggested that the Iraqi government was considering using UAVs to target the US. The January 2003 NIE revised this claim, and said only that the software could be used for this purpose. The Air Force, Anny and Defense Intelligence Agency dissented from this judgment as well, and argued that the purpose of the Iraqi request was to acquire a generic mapping capability.

Amendment 97 – strike but these judgments were revised a few months later, in January 2003. strike and suggested and insert which the IC said suggested; strike The January 2003 NIE revised this claim, and said only that the software could be used for this purpose. The Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency dissented from this judgment as well, and argued that the purpose of the Iraqi request was to acquire a generic mapping capability.

Comment – We believe it is irrelevant whether the judgment later changed. This report is supposed to determine whether statements were substantiated by the intelligence policymakers had when they made the statement, not intelligence that came out later. Additionally, the President said “we are concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States.” This statement is not inconsistent with the NIE published in January. The IC remained concerned about this possibility.

Feel free to peruse the archives in the category labeled, Iraq/al Qaeda connection, if you wish to know more. 🙂

That was the only justification for war highlighted by the Bush administration and the mainstream media leading up to the invasion.

Sorry to disagree, but it was only one of a number of cases put forth for justification; and one that war architects did not want to push heavily. It was Colin Powell who unilaterally crafted his speech before the UN General Assembly to put heavy emphasis on the wmd angle, which Feith, Rumsfeld and company didn’t feel was necessary, and may even be harmful (ultimately, it was harmful given stockpiles were not found).

Naturally, as soon as it was evident that there were no WMDs a host of other justifications emanated from the Bush administration and were reported, unchallenged by the White House Press Corps and their corporate masters.

It’s true that the Administration’s language changed after major combat operations and it looked unlikely that they would find wmd stockpiles; and it’s unfortunately, really, that the White House didn’t fight the false allegations and media distortions harder. They simply decided to “move on”.

We are not protecting ourself by being in Iraq.

Had President Bush caved to media, world opinion, public U.S. opinion fed by media distortions and lies, by the latest IED bombing, and decided to abandon all responsibility for Iraq and pull troops out, leaving chaos in our wake….do you consider that “protecting ourselves”? If you think the U.S. credibility was harmed by the invasion, do you think such a hasty, selfish, irresponsible retreat would restore us credibility?

We should have finished off the AQ remnants and Taliban in Afghanistan.

We never left Afghanistan.

We’ve been fighting al Qaeda all over the globe.

I’m sure some of you have read Michael Scheuer. Despite his inconsistencies, I believe him when he says that perhaps the greatest threat to our safety is our agressive approach to the Muslim world.

This is where Michael Scheuer and Ron Paul really lose me. The converse can also be true: That it was our weak response to terrorism throughout the 90’s, past show of weakness (our apparent lose in Vietnam) that gave bin Laden the impression that America was a “paper tiger”….inviting more terror attacks.

If the war is about us vs. Islam, then we are fighting with a losing strategy. But the war was never about that (yes, I know some rightwingers wish it were- but it’s not the war President Bush told us we were in). Al Qaeda wants the Muslim world to believe that it is just that. But they’ve lost credibility in the eyes of many in the Muslim sphere, THANKS in part to the last couple of years of developments in Iraq (i.e., their brutality toward fellow Muslims who can’t live up to their narrow standards and interpretation of Islamic Law as well as the obvious- WE are the ones building hospitals, mosques, schools, and infrastructure at cost of American blood and treasure, on behalf of the Iraqi people).

Our enemies are patient and don’t measure time as we do. AQ bombed the WTC in 1993, and then again 8 years later. They don’t care who the president is. They’re not holding off because we invaded Iraq, but because the time is not ripe.

Yes, I’ve heard the “experts” talk about how patient al Qaeda is; but I’ve also heard other “experts” talk about how off-balance al-Qaeda is. Leadership is difficult to replace, and their leaders have been killed and captured for the last 7 years. Being al Qaeda is a one-way ticket to hell thanks to our aggressive post-9/11 war against those who declared it.

President Bush deserves enormous credit for keeping America safe for the last 7 years. It’s no accident. Terror cells have been constantly disrupted and plots foiled thanks to the global effort to fight Islamic terrorism, led by the U.S, as well as implementation of such necessary 21st century tools such as The Patriot Act and the NSA Surveillance programs.

The only chance we have is diplomacy with Muslim leaders. It needs to be worth their while to rein in their extremist elements. The time to set forth on a diplomatic solution is now.

What the deuces are you talking about here? What “Muslim leaders” do you mean specifically? Religious? Secular governments, who are the targets of Islamists themselves for not governing by Sharia?

Do you think the Bush Administration has simply thrown diplomacy out the window? Then you’ve bought into the Bush Derangement Syndrome worldview.