Possibly one of the best, and most honest overviews of the Iraq SOFA negotiations comes from Unlike most news outlets that state their content with such conviction, Fadhil points out that understanding each of the factions beefs is especially difficult since little about the negotiation specifics are known at this time to *any* one.
Or, as he puts it, the details “are rarely shared beyond the closed circle of the executive branches in Washington and Baghdad, leaving lawmakers in both countries in the dark for now. Personally, I think this is wise because too many voices prior to hammering out a starting point draft is anything but productive.
Despite the lack of details, there are varying levels of acceptance and rejection for what basics they do know. And knowing these objections is valuable for even the first SOFA draft. Oddly enough, there are only two groups with an absolute no-compomise/reject attitude. That would be the Association of Muslim scholars, and Sadr’s clan.
The Muslim scholars are Sunni clerics, formed in April 2003 after the fall of Saddam to unite the Sunni ulema, the highest Iraq sunni authorities. Their historic sympathies lie with Saddam’s old regime and AQ. However the AMSI has found their support by Sunnis significantly diminishing since “the awakening” of tribal leaders, and perhaps had their biggest setback last November when Sheikh Ahmed Abdul Ghafour al Samarrai, the leader of the Sunni Religious Endowments (more clerics…) ordered the closure of the AMSI headquarters in the Umm al Quraa mosque.
As reported by Bill Roggio in the Long War Journal:
The crackdown on the Association of Muslim Scholars is part of the efforts of Sunni scholars to delegitimize the religious support given to al Qaeda in Iraq and other radical Islamic extremist groups in Iraq. The creation of the Council of Iraqi Scholars, or Council of Ulema of Iraq, has led the way in alienating the radical clerics.
The Council of Iraqi Scholars was formed in early April 2007 after over 60 senior Sunni clerics gathered in Amman, Jordan. The religious leaders sought to wrest control of the religious edicts, or fatwas, issued by the radical clerics in the Association of Muslim Scholars. Sheikh Abdul Malik al Saadi, Iraq’s preeminent Sunni scholar, leads the council. Samarrai is also an influential member and acts as the council’s spokesman.
Likewise, Sadr’s having a hard time generating enough protesters against the SOFA negotiations. From Fadhil’s article today:
Earlier crowds are estimated to be in the thousands. The most recent public protest in Karbala was, according to The Associated Press, attended by “hundreds.” Protests in Sadr City, the bastion of the Mahdi Army, drew 1,500 protesters last Friday.
With the two “naysayers” losing support, and basically out of the way, this brings us to the majority who agree a SOFA is necessary in some form. Last week, two Iraqi Assembly members traveled to DC and addressed Congress.
Khalaf Ilayan, a leader of one of the three components of the Accord Front, favors waiting until the new POTUS sits in the Oval Office. His peer, Nadeem Jabiri of the Islamic Fadheela Party, concerns himself with Iraq “sovereignty”, and their practical progress as a bureaucratic body.
“The Iraqi government right now still does not have full rein of its sovereignty because of the thousands of foreign troops now on its land. … And perhaps the Iraqi government does not have yet sufficient tools to run its own internal affairs. Therefore I ask the American government not to embarrass the Iraqi government (by) putting it in a difficult situation with this agreement.”
Both observations, IMHO, have merit. And indeed, despite the ill-timing of the December 2008 expiration of the UN mandate, it may be premature to lock in such long term specifics while the pieces on the chess board are moving. Not only will there be a new POTUS, but even more importantly, Iraq has provincial elections coming up. The Sunni bloc membership is apt to have a significant profile change… and most likely for the better as Sunni leadership from the awakening movement are strong shoe ins.
But I’m not posting to discuss what we don’t know on the negotiations, or their not-so-convenient timing. What I want to do is remind everyone of the common thread here – the very important link between these upcoming SOFAs and our recent SCOTUS opinion.
Or more succinctly put, the agreed to sovereignty of our Iraq bases affects the detention, rights and protections of any combatants the US harbors there. And last, but not least, that agreement will also affect the rights and protections of our US soldiers and support civilian contractors.
Sounds familiar now, don’t it? While we don’t have details, Iraqis discussing yielding sovereignty as a point of contention may infer that US bases in Iraq are demanding sovereignty as a preferred contractual point. If that is the case, as SCOTUS has ruled, Habeas Corpus and combatants with Constitutional rights leers it’s head yet again.
If no sovereignty, what of our own troops? Will they (and the support civilian contractors) will be subject to the many harsh Saddam regime laws still on the books? Will US military and American citizens find themselves in front of Iraq judges for crimes considered un Islamic?
If the Pentagon has got a clue… they’ll demand the sovereignty for our guys, but won’t be holding any of the bad guys (who’ll race for their attorneys upon arrest) at that location. In short, the SCOTUS decision has had the over reaching effect to limit some aspects and useage of these proposed US temporary bases in Iraq. This recent reality may dictate some new concerns in terms for these SOFAs.
Put your imagination in fast forward… landing after the musical chairs of Iraq Assembly and POTUS leadership. Assuming we get a friendlier Sunni bloc after provincial elections, which POTUS will be defining the SOFA demands for US interests? Certainly if McCain wins, he has already said he supports bases there for as long as the Iraqis needs and mission demands. But what are his ideas of terms for these bases? McCain was appalled with this SCOTUS opinion. Does he know how these SOFAs can mirror the same problem if not structured correctly?
And what of Obama, and his ever morphing stance? (see Curt’s “Once Before, and Again and Again” post) Will BHO be taking this SOFA agreement into consideration for soldiers, detainees and contractors? If there is no agreement, and the UN mandate isn’t renewed, what happens then? Does BHO pull us out immediately, saying any Iraq failures are not his fault because the agreement wasn’t hammered out in time?
I’d say it’s about time for some bright lightbulb reporter to begin hounding Obama *and* McCain on some real Iraq specifics… like this SOFA agreement… and their idea of needed terms in a post-Boumediene opinion world. It’s not enough to say “no permanent bases”, because we’re already quite outspoken in the fact the bases are not permanent.
What begs to be asked is how can this SOFA best be constructed to provide protections to our American soldiers and civilians, without giving the same to captured combatants?
This oughta be good… I’m dying to hear their answers because I’m not sure that both can be accomplished. And if one has to be sacrificed, which will it be?
Vietnam era Navy wife, indy/conservative, and an official California escapee now residing as a red speck in the sea of Oregon blue.
I read this piece earlier this afternoon and thought Curt would post it; it is thoughtfully sown into the SCOTUS ‘decision’.
In one word I can tell you why this piece is not “one of the best,” nor possibly “one of the most honest” pieces I’ve read regarding this subject: Sistani. His name is not even mentioned and he’s the one man that can, if he wants, put all the Shia parties in parliament in his pocket and do what he wants.
The greatest possible obstacle in this agreement: Sistani, the premier Iraqi Shiites’ source of emulation, not a single word; The Grand Ayatollah, who told Bremmer to take his government by fiat and ‘stick it’; the Highest Cleric, who set 4 conditions for this agreement spoken personally to Maliki, himself: 1. transparency, 2. defending national governance, 3. national consensus and 4. approving the agreement by parliament …not a word about him or his conditions.
We might need to remind Fadhil that this SOFA story resided only in “wonkville” until news broke that there were rumors of Sistani giving out personal fatwas against US troops; then days later decreeing troops shouldn’t be given water or food; …days later his spokesmen stating he opposed the agreement; …days later he ends up meeting with Maliki and giving him his 4 conditions for the agreement.
It’s utterly fantastic this aspect of the story is left out.
First off, Doug, don’t blame Curt for posting what you feel is neither “the best”, or “the most honest” report on the SOFAs. I posted it, so you may blame me for an opinion with which you do not agree.
I considered it both because what the article does point out is:
1: Not as many blocs are as opposed to a SOFA, with terms they can accept, as western media has generously portrayed in the past, and
2: There are so few in the inner circles who actually know what the terms are, that news hounds are really passing off speculation and quotes those not in the know as news. It is obvious that neither Iraq nor US lawmakers have a clue as to the terms being bandied about. Thus their comments are nothing more than political posturing about the “what ifs”.
However, the gist of my post – which you choose to ignore (note the title??) – was that the terms of this SOFA must be constructed with the SCOTUS decision in mind for it to be of the highest and best use to US forces. And you know, as I said before, if it doesn’t provide that, I’m just fine to let the pieces fall as they may, and have the US forces come home. That decision for withdrawal then falls on the Iraq govt’s shoulders, and not a POTUS acting against the most recent wishes of President Jalabi, who requested the US forces stay at least another couple of years.
But since you choose to take the side tangent of Sistani iand the SOFA, let’s go there. The most recent Sistani-speak is late May, saying he would not allow the signing of the agreement “as long as he is alive”. Sounds ominous, eh?
But, to place that in a realistic context, in the next breath he fully supported the Iraqi government and their efforts to establish security and stability in the country.
A quote attributed to the head of the Shi’ites United Iraqi Alliance block, Sheik Jalaluddin Al-Saghir, said via a comes from a KUNA article May 24, 2008:
Again you are talking whispered media rumours here when you assume Sistani will instigate some violent civil war. Fact is, there has been no fatwa for armed resistance issued. And that follows Sistani’s behavioral history. He has opposed the US and coalition forces presence since day one. Therefore, it’s not surprising he’d continue that attitude with any possible SOFA.
But also historically, Sistani has consistently sided with the Iraqi govt. On the times when he disagrees, he has advocated only peaceful resistance, instead utilizing the Iraq legal and political channels. If his influence remains that powerful, there should be no problems in Sistani getting his way with both the population, and the Assembly. Additionally, he does not give Sadr support in his armed resistence and has slapped him down – albeit gently – each time.
BUT… there is nothing in his past that suggests he would instantly turn to violent fatwas… as the erroneous rumours suggested he did a few weeks ago.
The Shia majority are going to take in consideration all factors – including Sistani’s demands – and try for the agreement that best suits them. The US will try for an agreement that best suits us. We’ll either land in the middle, or it won’t happen at all and Iraq may be forced to secure the country withouany US help.
What is most likely is the final say on the SOFA terms (for the US interests) is likely to be the next POTUS and his Pentagon advisors. If it’s Obama, it’s entirely likely that Sistani will be happy as a pig in poke, because I don’t expect Obama to stand up for the protections and interests of the US military for a base there. I’d wager he’d cave to Sistani and the Iraqs, leave a shadow force there with all personnel at the mercy of Iraq law.
Since we wouldn’t have sovereignty in that event, that may cure the issue of habeas for any detainees. Then again, our base personnel may be answering, in essence, to the Iraqis in their daily operation. I’d rather be gone completely than have a base under those terms.
Either way, both candidates should be questioned in depth on their ideal US terms for a SOFA… most especially in the wake of this SCOTUS BS.
MataHarley,
I made a mistake: Hakim met with Sistani, not Maliki over the 4 condition points. I suppose I mistakingly compressed the “…as long as I’m alive” meeting with the 4 points meeting (that occurred the following week) as last nite it was very late and I was in a hurry.
Therefore, with this change, the “most recent Sistani-speak” isn’t late May, (as you mentioned) but early June:
http://www.upi.com/Emerging_Threats/2008/06/05/Sistani_speaks_out_on_US-Iraqi_compact/UPI-16731212718553/
It’s this important meeting that’s missing from the story— pretty important when you consider Fadhil spends some time on Hakim and his party.
Lastly, I don’t have the time to pluck out all the loose beams in the piece, but it’s not a tight piece; just judging it from Fadhil not mentioning Maliki surprising everyone last week saying, “Iraq has another option that it may use. The Iraqi government, if it wants, has the right to demand that the UN terminate the presence of international forces on Iraqi sovereign soil.”
Then Fadhil misses mentioning Sistani’s and Hairi’s opposition; then last, but not least, Hakim, who does enjoy good relations with the Administration, must do more that “walk a tight-rope” (as Fadhil states) with the US and Iran and Iraq …he must defy his Shi’ite constituency! …he must defy Iran!–given Iran’s massive public relations campaign against the agreement.
In my opinion, the piece sugar coated the narrative making it easier to swallow for those that entertain vacant hopes over evidence.
Geez, Doug… we’re trading cyber notes on your opinion of the article because Sistani doesn’t figure prominently?? The article left out comments of many in that “inner circle”.
The reason I consider the article honest, and the reason I posted it, remain the same:
1: Sistani, and most Iraq factions are not in complete opposition
2: No one but a select few know what terms are being bandied about
3: The terms of the agreement for the US side are likely to be made by a new POTUS
You don’t like the article and have said so. Fine. But this is like writing a review about a meal, and you concentrating the restaurant’s drapes, guy. Once again… THE POINT! Follow closely. We should be asking the candidates about this SOFA as part of vetting a new POTUS – all because of this SCOTUS decision.
This article is the first of it’s kind to actually confess the media, and lawmakers of both Iraq and the US know jack shit about the specifics of the negotiations… unlike most that have proclaimed doom and gloom prematurely (on which you so like to rely). So I suggest that you, just like the rest of us, know nothing of which you speak on the demands, or whether there is a chance to findthe medium ground.
Instead, you constantly shroud the process in failure as an inevitable fact. Might I suggest you need an attitude adjustment instead of living daily in negative Nancy mode??
You musta been one impatient kid on Christmas morning…..
Let the process run it’s course. When it’s done, you can criticize to your heart’s content. Until then, I suggest your tarot card reading holds no credibility. But it does reflect who you are, and whether you see a glass half full or half empty.
No doubt you have heard that in our interest to be “flexible” with the Iraqis, not to trample their sovereignty, we are “backing down on full immunity for civilian U.S. security contractors in Iraq”.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/17/AR2008061702596.html
According to my memory there are over 100,000 American “contractors” in Iraq.
Yep, I did, Doug. But then I knew that would be the first baby to go down the drain with the bathwater.