Part 1
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Part 2
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There is no argument that the explosion and sinking of Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico – injuring 17 and presumably killing the 11 men missing who were on the main level of the platform – is a tragedy. No less tragic than the loss of life and injuries is the environmental impact the ensuing oil spill will have on fragile US Gulf Coast ecosystems and economy. As all hands hit the deck… from private contractors and military… to contain the spill heading towards land masses, fueled by weather, there is much the rest of us can ponder.
How vast can the damage be? And how should this affect Obama’s recent nod to offshore drilling?
It was only yesterday when Obama and Gibbs announced they remained committed to offshore drilling exploration. But today’s a new day. Whether bowing to Congressional peer pressure, or simply stunned by the speed at which the tragedy escalated, the POTUS shifted gears and today declared all plans are on hold until the Dept of Interior and Homeland Security complete their investigations for the cause.
It’s too early to tell, but already speculation has begun. The rig is a fifth generation engineering feat… but all the advancements in the world cannot eliminate the risk of a blowout. Transocean acknowledges that something happened in the hole… some abnormal build up of pressure. But at least two oil rig savvy engineers find that surprising, with the complex safeguards built in to minimize that event.
As for the damage estimates, the jury is still out on the Horizon’s impact. According to a CBS story yesterday, it would take two months for the 5000 bbls (or 210,000 gallons) daily, continuing to leak from the seabed floor, to equal the volume of the Exxon Valdez 11,000 million gallon spill in Alaska’s Prince William Sound. in 1989. The question is, how much time will it take to turn off the oil tap?
It remains unclear how much oil will flow into the Gulf before the flow can be cut off. The teams of state, federal and company officials charged with the cleanup have tried unsuccessfully to activate an underwater cutoff valve and now say they plan to dig a relief well half a mile away – a process that could take weeks or months. (BP, the company that leased the sunken rig, is currently leading the cleanup effort but has asked the military for assistance.)
While British energy giant, BP – singled out by the POTUS as the fiscally responsibly culprit – remains the corporate spokesman for the press, the rig was actually under lease contract. The Deepwater Horizon was designed, constructed, maintained and operated by Transocean LTD, headquartered out of Switzerland. As of Feb 2009, Transocean owned, had partial ownership interests in or operated 136 mobile offshore drilling rigs. The Deepwater Horizon is only one of 12 of the company’s ultra-deepsea rigs, drillerships or semi-submersibles in the Gulf. They have a commendable safety record.
When assessing the risks, there are two major categories… the loss of life in oil rig accidents, and any ensuing oil spills.
In the first category, the loss of life, the Deepwater Horizon doesn’t even come close to measuring up to the nine deadliest rig disasters. The most horrific toll of life was in 1988 aboard Occidental’s Piper Alpha Platform on the UK Continental shelf, where 167 of some of the stoutest industry workers lost their lives due to a gas explosion and fire. There was no oil spill. The 9th position deadliest disaster was in October 2007 on Petróleos Mexicanos Perforadora Central Usumacinta Jack-Up in Kab Field, Bay of Campeche, Gulf of Mexico. Twenty-two workers died during a storm collision between the platform and the vessel, the Usumacinta.
The adverse weather conditions caused oscillating movements of Usumacinta jack-up from around 1200 hours on the 23 October. These movements caused the cantilever deck of the Usumacinta to strike the top of the production valve tree on the Kab-101 platform, resulting in a leak of oil and gas. At 1420 hours, the subsurface safety valves of wells 101 and 121 were closed by PEMEX personnel, but the valves were unable to seal completely allowing the continued leaking of oil and gas. At around 1535 hours on 23 October, the 81 personnel on the Usumacinta were evacuated by lifeboat, with the ship Morrison Tide providing fire support. Rough seas hampered the rescue operation and appear to have caused the break-up of at least one liferaft.
Well control personnel were despatched to the Kab-101, with operations delayed by further bad weather and H2S release. Well control operations commenced with attempts to inject heavy mud followed by cement. Operations were again delayed on 13 November when a spark initiated by on-going work caused a fire to break out. The fire was extinguished the following day on 14 November at 2350 hours. A second fire broke out on 20 November, causing the collapse of the Usumacinta’s derrick and major damage to the cantilever and connecting bridge. The fire was extinguished the same day with no injuries.
Several phases of work then commenced, including debris removal from the Usumacinta, the attachment of a valve for controlled flaring, the installation of a blow-out preventer and finally the shutting in of the well followed by killing with heavy mud and plugging with cement. By 17 December 2007, PEMEX reported complete control of the well.
The resulting spill was “…circa 422 barrels per day of mostly light crude, of which 40% was estimated to have evaporated.”
As even the current POTUS noted just 18 days before the Horizon tragedy, oil rigs generally are not the source of oil spills.
I don’t agree with the notion that we shouldn’t do anything. It turns out, by the way, that oil rigs today generally don’t cause spills. They are technologically very advanced. Even during Katrina, the spills didn’t come from the oil rigs, they came from the refineries onshore.
The lib/prog site, FireDogLake, was quick to point out that that rigs do indeed create oil spills on occasion…. 124 of them alone during Hurricane Rita and Katrina. However, lacking a perspective, FireDogLake doesn’t put the amounts it cites into proper perspective. The total of all those spills was 743,700 gallons – a mixture of crude and condensate, plus refined oil. Compared to the Horizon’s output, that’s the equivalent of leaking 3.5 days, and containable.
In fact, when it comes to oil spills, oil rigs are not the culprit. Using The Mariner Group’s statistics of oil spills from 1967 to 2004, there’s noted record of 120 major oil spill occurences. Out of those, approx three were the result of oil rigs… two of them on the same rig operated by Brazil’s Petrobras – a company with a record of violations and less than stellar safety record. The other was a Canadian rig in Nov 2004.
Approximately eight of those 120 were pipeline breaks, and one from an exploratory well accident.
The rest? Oil tankers take up the bulk of these. And not necessarily accidents. Often it’s just a common, but illegal, discharging of the tanks they do while underway at sea.
When taken into perspective, do we need to turn overprotective and skittish because of the Deepwater Horizon tragedy, backing away from a practice that historically has a good record for safety and performance?
And if we decide to punish oil rigs and offshore drilling with a kneejerk reaction, what will be the reaction to the true largest offender – the oil tankers crisscrossing the seas 24/7?
It’s likely the public will never get the true dose of reality on oil rigs and oil spills from the MSM… or even the infrequency of such accidents. Because I’m quite sure this will be seized upon for political purposes… And I’m equally sure that the political battle will rage, and take center stage even while all powers that be race to minimize the loss of wildlife and environmental damage.
It’s time we pulled our perspectives into focus. We do experience crises and accidents. There is no power in the world, or even the best laid of precautions, that will eliminate accidents – no more than a mother can keep her son, who broke his arm while climbing a tree, safe by moving him to the desert for the rest of his life. This is a great tragedy. But we must also temper our reactions with a hefty dose of reality.
Transocean Ltd. Provides Deepwater Horizon Update
ZUG, SWITZERLAND, Apr 26, 2010 (MARKETWIRE via COMTEX) –Transocean Ltd. (NYSE: RIG) (SIX: RIGN) today provided the following update on the Deepwater Horizon and the company’s role in supporting BP Exploration & Production, Inc. and the Unified Area Command in stemming the flow of hydrocarbons from the well.The Deepwater Horizon is insured for total loss coverage and for wreck removal, to the extent removal can be carried out and is required. The total insured value of the rig is $560 million.
The rig sank in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico after an explosion and fire last week, and it is now located on the sea floor approximately 1,500 feet northwest of the well center and away from any subsea pipelines. Transocean is committing all necessary resources to support ongoing efforts to stop the flow of hydrocarbons from the well.
Transocean is the world’s largest offshore drilling contractor and the leading provider of drilling management services worldwide. With a fleet of 139 mobile offshore drilling units plus three ultra-deepwater units under construction, the company’s fleet is considered one of the most modern and versatile in the world due to its emphasis on technically demanding segments of the offshore drilling business. Its worldwide fleet is more than twice the size of the next-largest competitor. The company owns or operates a contract drilling fleet of 45 High-Specification Floaters (Ultra-Deepwater, Deepwater and Harsh-Environment semisubmersibles and drillships), 26 Midwater Floaters, 10 High-Specification Jackups, 55 Standard Jackups and other assets utilized in the support of offshore drilling activities worldwide.
Statements regarding any future aspect of the incident on the Deepwater Horizon, the effects, damage assessment, support of efforts by others, insurance coverage, as well as any other statements that are not historical facts, are forward-looking statements that involve certain risks, uncertainties and assumptions. These include but are not limited to actions by the Unified Area Command and governmental agencies, actions by insurers, customers and other third parties, results of investigations and assessments, and other factors detailed in Transocean’s most recent Form 10-K and other filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which are available free of charge on the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov. Should one or more of these risks or uncertainties materialize, or should underlying assumptions prove incorrect, actual results may vary materially from those indicated.
Is reading a lost art here, Greg? First of all, you’re only several calls behind CRAP who attempts to assert the same argument that this particular part would change the outcome. Let’s revert to what you guys prefer not to read and absorb as realities, okay?
1: BP doesn’t own the rig. As my post and ensuing comments point out, it was Transocean’s rig and decision to install any additional mechanisms post it’s construction. Please see the comments from the BP CEO. BP just leased the rig.
I repeat… as I did to CRAP. Would you lease a vehicle for business, and then install your own safety airbags? This is not BP’s call. It’s Transocean’s. Why is this so difficult for a few of you to grasp? Authorities are clearly outlined. All BP could do was refuse to honor their lease contract if Transocean did not install any particular upgrade feature. Even at that, one would have to read the lease contract, and find out if they had that authority and ability to break a lease based on that demand.
2: There is NO guarantee… as your comment implies… that this mechanism that turns off a BOP at the well cap on the ocean floor (which already exists on this rig, BTW) survives and functions after a high pressure blast such as this. This is speculative, and nothing more than a politlcal assumption on your part that is not supported by any findings relating to this event. Fact is, it could have had that feature, and the very same result would have happened. Please note comments by “James” and oil man from Alberta. Could such a mechanism survive a blast of that strength intact and functional? At this point, no one knows until an investigation is concluded.
As the WSJ article states, such a safeguard is a back up to an already present fail safe that generally works. Whether is performs when the other doesn’t is purely speculative.
Let me bring this down to something simple. I’m in a m’cycle accident. I’m not wearing a helmet. You guys argue I would have survived if I did. Yet my autopsy reveals I died from internal chest injuries or bleeding. Would a helmet “safety requirement” save my life then? Of course not. It’s all horse manure.
Is yet one more back up system on the rigs a good idea? Of course. But if the dang physical mechanism that closes the value at the well is damaged in the blast, no remote and back up systems are going to close what doesn’t function. Kapisch?
Until the final investigation as to what happened with the built in safety mechanisms is available — and yes, that 2001 rig had safety mechanisms — stop spreading propaganda, and stick the the facts.
UPDATE: Informative article coming (inadvertently) from lib/prog forum commenter ch3cooh on Upstream.com.
Skipping the political, self-servicing crap elsewhere on the threads, the below is an alternative “solution” currently being explored – a BOP (blowout protector) atop another BOP – and posted from an article appearing on Upstream.com (NOTE: Upstream is a specialized Oil/Gas industry publication)
Yo… oil guy from Alberta? You still out there? Is this feasible as a “cure”?
I’m exactly not sure what the debate is here. To blame BP or not? I think ultimately BP will be responsible for in the same way a General contractor is responsible for the subcontractors he hires. But that’s besides the point.
The real issue is how will respond to this in the future. If there is some additional technology available that MAY HAVE prevented this then should we require that oil rigs use them? We now know that a spill of this magnitude is possible so should we now raise the bar of ‘worst case scenario’.
This oil spill could have a devastating effect on the Gulf region for several years. We’re still going to drill in the Gulf and new rigs will go online in the future so what new safety requirements should those new rigs have?
Can we not stuff Henry Waxman into the leaking pipe and plug the leak until the well can be cemented?
NO! We don’t want Waxman or any other far left fool from Congress near that rig. They will just find a new way to tax it…
@james, my original point is that we should not allow the obvious political football game to take place because of this tragedy.
Yes, as I’ve pointed out far more than once, the “general contractor”, BP, will be held liable… along with Transocean (a less inviting villian because they have a good safety record), and now the bonus of Halliburton.
But to allow this tragedy and crisis to affect offshore policy is absurd. As my post points out, the main culprits for oil spills(approx 96%) is not offshore drilling, but oil tankers and maritime accidents. After the Exxon Valdez, should we have banned tankers? In fact, to choke the Gulf oil supply, 25% of the nation’s source, would mean replacing that with shipped oil from elsewhere, increasing the risks of oil spills. Brilliant….
In fact, even loss of life is rare with offship drilling or platforms. The link to historic rig events is in the original post…. not many in the past four decades.
Thus the spill and damage needs to be dealt with expediently, and the event needs to be placed in it’s proper prospective. Kneejerk reactions by this WH and Congress should be fought. But we sure are guaranteed some kneejerks reacting.
@Mata, I don’t disagree with you. A knee jerk reaction is never good. However, I believe I correct in assuming that the “Drill Baby Drill” mantra requires an adjustment. The meme was that it made no sense not to drill in any place where there where oil is located. No one could ever perceive an event like what is taking place in the Gulf. Now, the individual state will re-calculate their risk assessment and you can imagine states like California and Florida will be much more hesitant with offshore drilling.
When I read about a Governor calling the spill and act of God, I can’t help but think he doesn’t get it. A hurricane is an act of God, this was a mechanical failure. It’s beyond my capacity to know if anything could have been done to prevent this spill from taking place. But I don’t believe that it is a knee jerk reaction or surprising that this is giving pause to a lot of folks out there.
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I have 35 years experience in the upstream oil industry mainly in drilling and down hole production, so I know very well what I am talking about:
1. Transocean is a contractor working for BP, they are responsible for the rig but not for the well. For the well they shall do what ever BP asked for and they are paid for that. So all drilling operations including the well safety are under the BP supervision, and no contractor can do anything in the well or on the well without BP order or at least authorization.
2. The large number of Transocean employees on the rig are working for the few people from BP who are supervising operations, that is the way it is.
3. BP selected the rig and contracted it to drill the well according to the drilling program fixed by BP. Before starting the job, BP should have inspected the rig (or made it inspected by a third party) to certify it suitable for the intended operations from all aspects including safety.
4. Now either the rig is not fully suitable to drill the well (modified BOP, etc) then BP are guilty because they contracted the rig and accepted it to drill the well, or it is fully suitable and then the well operations and safety are the full responsibility of BP, unless they can prove that what happened is due to the contractor personal mistake or equipment failure
5. As far as I know, we are talking about operation mistakes: displacing mud with sea water, accepted BOP failed tests, may be also not waiting for cement to set and not testing proporly the cement plug, but never about contractor personnel mistakes or contractor rig failure, so where is the responsibility of Transocean on all that?
6. It is completely wrong and misleading to compare a rig to a car, because cars are standard manufactured with some few options. Rigs are built for specific jobs and they are equipped differently according to the job to be done. Further more, any Dilling Contractor will add subtract or modify the equipment on the rig according to the client request who will pay for that, as did for example Transocean on the Deep Water Horizon on 2005 at BP request.
7 NK or any other party could destroy a riser or the rig but they could never blowout a well unless they are operating it.
BP failed so far to control the well but they highly succeeded to create confusion about their responsibility and about what happened on April 20th, among a large public as we see for example here (but even worse anywhere else). They called for solutions to control the well but they never gave any information about the well (profile, depths, temperatures, pressure, etc.), and the technical operations with timing during at least the 48 h preceding the blowout (or am I wrong, please correct me). Are they serious or is-it another way to keep the public away from what exactly happened.
It is really sad.
Thank you for weighing in, Mamado. I may disagree with culpability, because I believe both BP and Transocean… and perhaps Halliburton if they find the cementing was faulty… will all bear the burden of legal liability. Even Transocean has already taken steps to limit their liability cap, which would indicate to me that they are well aware they will also be found on the hook for fiscal responsibility. Were it as clean cut as you suggest, this would be unnecessary.
My comparison via a leased car was to suggest that the “standard equipment”, which did include the BOPs and backups already required on the rig, would not be the responsibility of BP. If they wanted additional back up position, BP certainly could request that as part of their contract, with the costs of such sussed out between the two companies.
The Transocean safety record is quite good, Mamado. They aren’t the world’s largest offshore drilling contractor for nothing. Stuff like this isn’t good PR, and does nothing for their future fiscal health. As is usual during these events, there are those charged with addressing the problem, and those charged with handling the risk management for PR and litigation. Perhaps it’s the PR clean up crews from each company that you derive a lack of “serious” intent. But I’m not seeing any foot dragging on their attempts to stop the gushing. We are in new territory with these depths since none of this is accessible by humans, and is done by remotes. But I do have to say that the more I read about the technical challenges, and what they are attempting, I am wow’d by the technology.
The latest that I understand is that the well is more stable to address because of the mixture of gas with oil being pushed out. That’s why they are going for inserting a tube inside the broken pipeline. But they still have ample back up plans as well, including the small cap waiting on the seabed, and plugging the well itself. I think they gave a new date of any of these immediate back ups working as the 18th.
INRE the specifics you mention… there are some rough media reports about well depth (32,000 ft below the seabed), but not necessarily projectory or pressure measurements provided in these reports. I’m darned sure those specifics are included in ongoing investigations by MMS, the USCG and the internal investigation. But this is the BP release of what they *do* know of the event.
The pressure tests, according to this document, seems to indicate good to go. When hydrocarbons were introduced during the mud displacement phase, the BOP and diverter did activate. This seems to be a sign they were working as designed.
Post explosion, the Emergency Disconnect did appear to be activated, but they also state that there were modifications in the BOP, and that some leaks in the BOP hydraulics were discovered.
INRE the modifications, were they improvements and upgrades? Can’t imagine Transocean would endanger their employees and rig by cutting corners. And the hydraulics? Is it possible that systems could have been damaged by the explosion, and wasn’t pre’existing prior?
Until the results from the investigation are in, it’s really had to say if this is just uncontrollable Mother Nature in the high pressure well, or operational errors. Whichever it turns out to be, I think we can say with certainty it wasn’t a deliberate event. None of the companies involved ever wished for such a failure.
But I agree this is a sad event on many levels. THe loss of life being paramount. But also at risk is the kneejerk reaction to rare events that would entail putting a lot more tankers on the oceans to transport oil to make up for shutting down future operations. Considering that tankers are far more damaging, and frequent, than drilling rigs for spills, it strikes me extremely counterproductive as a solution.
UPDATE to the above, Mamado. This from testimony at the Congressional hearings, and may provide some of the data you seek.
Addressed was the hydraulics, as noted by testimony from the manuf, Cameron. A test ram – not the variable bore ram – had been connected to the socket that was supposed to activate the variable bore ram. And underpowered blind shear rams come up here.
Even with that, the plot thickens:
So at this point, who the heck knows?
Thanks MataHarley for the information from the testimony at the Congressional hearings, it is very clear to me. It is about the failure of the BOP to close and stop the blowout after the explosion. On each rig there are 3 types of BOP: pipe rams to close on specific pipes (drill pipe for example), shear rams to shear the pipes passing through BOP and close the well, and the annular which is an annular packing closing on any form or size of pipe. All of them need to be actuated to close the annulus between the pipe and the well bore. Testing them is function test them and applying a pressure to confirm that they can withstand it. But even here we are talking about the BOP failure after the explosion and still nothing about what happened before the explosion: why the BOP were not actuated or failed to stop the blowout and avoid the explosion?
I fully agree with you when you said ‘certainty it wasn’t a deliberate event. None of the companies involved ever wished for such a failure’
You are also talking about PR and fiscal responsibility and you are right to say the ongoing investigation will fix that and indeed only deep investigations by specialized people could clear it out.
But I am talking about the operations responsibility and what happened and trigged the blowout and the explosion. This is what will really help to avoid recurrence of such disaster today and in the future and we are all interested on that, it is somehow “lesson learned”. But all we have is a complete blackout and not a single information from the operator and the responsible of operations who is BP, contractors know about some but they are tied with the professional secret and cannot release publicly informations about BP operations.
I believe BP are keeping blackout about what happened because they know that it is not glorious for them, and they are very eloquent about what they are doing post explosion trying to improve their image and hopping that we forget about what happened and entailed the blowout. I fully understand their position but I strongly blame it.
I still disagree with you MataHarley, in your comparison with the leased car as BOP although they are standard equipment on rigs they are not standard types, and they are selected differently on each rig based on the planned operations. Also BP have the full responsibility of the operations including the well safety. Transocean responsibility is fully cleared with an official document signed by both parties before starting operations on the well and called rig acceptance, unless Transocean modified something on the rig after the rig acceptance without a formal approval from BP, or did not apply BP orders about operations and BP did not rise such matters which means they do not exist.
For your information, Offshore Technologies reports a planned well depth of only 18000 ft,
Investigations will take long time and will fix the relative responsibility of each party, but information about what happened and trigged the blowout is available with BP, and it could help avoid disasters or even incident. BP did not release yet the informations and seem creating and/or maintaining the total confusion about it. This is also too sad.
Steve Wereley, Associate Professor of Mechanical Engineering at Purdue University, has performed particle image velocimetry analysis of videos of the Gulf oil spill.
He estimates the actual flow rate to be far higher than the BP estimate. His figure is 70,000 barrels per day.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126809525
That would be laughable since the best wells in the Gulf are working overtime for 50K bbls daily, Greg. The Thunder Horse reservoir is the largest producer with anywhere from 250,000 to 300,000 bbls daily, but that’s with at least five wells supplying that amount. Thunder Hawk does about 45,000 bbls.
I will agree that it’s more than 5000 bbls, but 70K is beyond credibility. Especially since it’s a mixture of both methane gas and oil (with percentages not yet known), and pumping thru a partially closed BOP. This means that if it’s spewing even 50K bbls, and 75% of that is the methane gas, the oil would be about 12,500. At an even mixture, about 25,000. Nor is the flow necessarily constant. So it’s all guestimates at best.
Instead of listening to NPR’s normal BS and misguided reporting, you might want to check in with those more with hands on experience and in the know. I’ve been following those playing with the video imagery the same way at The Oil Drum. Their estimates range anywhere from 12,000 to 30,000 over there.
The light crude dissipates within a day, the methane not an issue, leaving only the heavier crude to deal with on the bulk of the spill. They are also injecting dispersants at the well head, so not all that flows out that would make it to the surface, does. Also, if there is significant wave action, it breaks up the oil into smaller droplets that are more easily absorbed by micro-organisms – as NatGeo puts it, it’s butter for oil loving microbes. The smell that’s being reported is actually the result of Mother Nature doing her part in the clean up… the evaporation of oil where it gets broken down by sunlight. So there are not only humans and dispersants at work here, but nature herself.
CORRECTION: was thinking in bbls, and not in gallons, as it was measured. Had to start thinking about a supertanker that size to remember… LOL Sorry..
One also needs to factor in that the Exxon Valdez spilled at least 11 million bbls into Prince William Sound.Unlike that smaller body of water, the GOM is the 11th largest body of water on the planet.Even were 50K bbls of pure crude escaping with no dispersant, it would take 220 days just to match the Valdez spill into the Alaskan sound.BTW, did you know the Valdez was only the 53rd largest spill on record?Don’t misunderstand. Being a long time denizen of the GOM, I do not take this lightly. I was raised skiing, fishing, scuba and boating in those waters. Many family and friends are still Gulf Coast residents from TX to FL. But I also keep a realistic perspective, and there are some extraordinary techs working on this 24/7. Perhaps I give them more credit than you do, Greg. Once they can control or cap the flow, clean up and healing can and will be effective. So elevating this for political agenda or hysteria starts getting on my nerves. A little less finger pointing and sweating stuff that has little bearing on clean up (like guestimates of flow rates, and assuming all of that is making it to the surface) would be appreciated.
In the meantime, when Energy Sec’y Chu went down there, he took a team of other science wizards to see if they could add to the already long line of contingency plans on the table. Can’t have enough good minds working on solutions in an arena where we have little real life experience… i.e. 5000′ depths. Chu returned from that meeting feeling more optimistic. And so am I.
Maybe using chemical dispersants is a really bad idea. They’re toxic themselves and only hide the problem by spreading oil out below the surface.
These good ol’ boys demonstrate a simple and highly effective way to deal with floating oil. Using their method, the surface is exactly where you want the oil to wind up.
http://www.wimp.com/solutionoil/
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