@ Wordsmith

Max Boot describes Grenada and Panama as places where the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine were applied. I suppose military historians can get things wrong, too. How was the beer?

If they were there, I didn’t see them. As far as I know, everyone out-processed at Rosie Roads. I saw Rangers and Snake-Eaters, including PJ’s from the AF and SeALs. There were a bunch of Marines, I was told they were all Force Recon guys.
The beer was fine. Great scenery on the beach too. A few months after Grenada, we held joint exercises in St. Lucia just in case another Grenada popped up. Same group of people for the most part. Except the hotel we stayed at in St. Lucia was nicer and the beaches were full of topless Europeans. They only had Heineken and Guiness. Our Chief had a pallet of Budweiser flown in. The didn’t have Bud Light back then.

IEDs are kind of a recent phenomenon, are they not?

A guy that works with me was in the Navy during Gulf War I. He was in a Hummer sitting between two Marines when they ran over a mine in the road. Improvised or not, explosives have always been used as a way to disable convoys. And you’re right and Curt’s post is right. I wasn’t saying the lack of armored Hummer’s was Rumsfeld’s part, it’s just his attitude on things. He’ll that may even be a direct quote from Rummy.

We have never gone into battle with the Army we wanted.

Only I think his quote was; “you don’t go to battle with the Army you want, you go with what you have.” And you’re right that the Bush Administration was left with a scaled down military thanks to Clinton, at least equipment-wise. Rumsfeld actually wanted to cut the Army down more than it was.
I just didn’t like the way Rumsfeld handled the war. But, much like you, I’m just being a Monday morning General. I like reading books on war and strategy. But I have no idea what resource issues or logistics issues they faced. If they had the resources and the logistics in place to provide heavy armored back-up and personnel bringing up the rear, I think they should have used it. There is nothing more intimidating that a tank coming down the road. And an M1A1 Abrams would not have held up traffic, unless they wanted it to.

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Max Boot describes Grenada and Panama as places where the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine were applied. I suppose military historians can get things wrong, too. How was the beer?

His policy is to work with what you have.

I still feel his off-the-cuff remark is twisted in meaning. He often speaks bluntly without weight and consideration to how it might be taken. Maybe he is insensitive; but the real question is how much he can be faulted for sending troops into battle, ill-prepared; how much he can be held accountable for mismanagement (of course, the buck ultimately stops at the top, all the way up to President Bush, who’s responsible for keeping Rumsfeld on the team- so you might as well also blame Bush for “working with what he has- CIA, Pentagon, State- and not the Depts he wished he had”).

IEDs are kind of a recent phenomenon, are they not? Not saying roadside bombs are new- they’re not; just their usage as a primary choice of weaponry (along with homicide bombers), with around 2/3rds of American soldiers killed by IEDs in Iraq (first one set off March 29, 2003; WaPo did a series on IEDs, I believe). Should this have been anticipated? Should Bush/Rumsfeld be blamed for the “lack of body armor” criticism (anymore than deserving credit for pro-activism)? Political, legitimate attack, or both?

Back at the time, Curt linked to the following:

“So, ignoring this new bit of information for the moment, what is the exact situation with Humvee armor production?

There are two actual armor programs for Humvees, the up-armor HMMWV or XM1114, which is a standard variant of the basic design, and add-on kits. The up-armored version includes an air-conditioned cab and modifications to vehicle suspension to handle the added weight, whereas the kits are simply attached to existing vehicles.

To put it in hard numbers, of 8,105 up-armored Humvees initially requested, more than 5,900 have so far been produced. The rest are expected to be ready by March 2005. These are the vehicles most widely discussed and are those supplied by Armor Holdings. Additionally, to date 9,146 armor kits have been installed of 9,776 produced.

According to DoD, Humvees that lack armor are carried into Iraq atop flatbed trucks and, once there, are used only inside the relative safety of U.S. bases.

Concerns regarding Humvee armor are justified given the enemy?s tactic of choice and the widespread perception of a shortfall in armor. But I don?t believe that Rumsfeld?s ?go to war with the Army you have? comment was inappropriate or ill considered.

First of all, he was correct. We have never gone into battle with the Army we wanted. Since World War II, we have entered conflicts with woefully unprepared, poorly equipped and undermanned armies. It is also fair to say that big-ticket items like new aircraft, missiles and warships have pretty consistently faired better in the appropriations process than the equally important, but much less politically sexy items like ammunition, training and gear. Indeed, Soldiers for the Truth was originally formed in an attempt to ameliorate this age-old problem.

During the late 1980s and into the 1990s the defense budget underwent drastic cuts in (I believe premature) reaction to the ?collapse? of the Soviet Union. President George H.W. Bush cut our active duty Army to eighteen divisions. At the time, I felt that was too low. Then Bill Clinton came along and reduced it to a mere ten. While reducing defense spending to hollow force levels, Clinton expanded the military mission abroad, pushing us to the snapping point. If one didnt?t know better, one might be tempted to call it deliberate sabotage.

So the Bush II administration came into office saddled with the disastrous consequences of Bill Clinton?s eight years. I am not making excuses for Rumsfeld, but one cannot look at our current situation honestly without taking this fact into account.”

The Pentagon’s spent billions trying to figure out ways and means to defeating the IED. What did the insurgents do in the face of improved armoring? They adapted and upped the explosives with a charge powerful enough to blast through improved armored vehicles and tanks. Simply “armoring up”, wouldn’t solve the dilemma.

Should Rumsfeld be blamed for an enemy that adapts? For not foreseeing the potential for such situations? Or perhaps seeing the potential, yet rolling the dice, anyway.

Should we have waited longer before restarting the war? More preparation? More planning? Hindsight vision suggests we had the time to do so; but then, wasn’t time also on the side of Saddam?

If we only went to war with the army we wished we had, we’d never go to war. Because the army I wished we had would be one straight out of science fiction where phasers could be set to stun and no lives on either side would be lost. But we don’t have the luxury of waiting another 300 years, let alone another 12 years and 17 UN Resolutions more. Well….actually we could have waited another decade; but then, what would the cost have been then? What has the cost been to us and the world for not having finished the job in ’91? We’re living that consequence, now.

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NYT:

…
The general denied that he had discussed — or even considered — resigning his command, as had been whispered about at the Pentagon, saying that he was committed to carrying out whatever mission Mr. Obama approved.

“I believe success is achievable,” he said. “I can tell you unequivocally that I have not considered resigning at all.”
…

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@ Wordsmith
Sweet Jeebus, I know why they call your Wordsmith now.

How do you define “Rumsfeld Doctrine”?

I define the Rumsfeld Doctrine as the use of a streamlined, fast moving force. There is nothing wrong with that. The military uses it all the time, even in WWII. The problem I have with it, is there is no one behind you.

I am aware of the Powell Doctrine as it relates to the decision to go to war; that’s not what I’m talking about. It isn’t up to military leaders to decide that issue. When I refer to the Powell Doctrine, I’m refering to the use of overwhelming force. Even in Gulf War I, there was still a mad dash. Our troops ran through the Iraqis like a hot knife through butter. But there were a lot more people in theatre.
As for Grenada, I was in Grenada. Well, that’s not really accurate, I was on the beach drinking beer in Barbados while the A-10′s I worked on were in Grenada. The Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force wasn’t used in Grenada. It was primarily Special Forces and a butt load of Marines. My squadron literally deployed 48 hours prior to the start of shooting.
And again, as for occupation duty, not the call of a military officer. But the military knows how to do it.

The original idea was to liberate and not occupy; we had counted on the Iraqi army and police force to remain intact; didn’t happen. Our intell knowledge of Iraq’s infrastructure was inaccurate; things went wrong, just as they did in planning Operation Overlord.

First, that’s Jimmeh Carter’s fault. We now rely on electronic intelligence far too much. We have no choice because Jimmeh gutted the CIA. Regardless, it’s Rumsfeld’s fault. You always, always plan for the worse and hope for the best. That’s not Rumsfeld’s policy. His policy is to work with what you have. That’s why he got in trouble for jumping that soldier in Iraq that said he’d like more armored vehicles. If he had pushed the light calvary through with full divisions bringing up the rear, our guys would have been in much better position to deal with the aftermath.
And I agree with you, there is a lot of brilliance in Rumsfeld’s work, but he should have had heavy reserves in the rear.
And I didn’t know this, but I love it:

for Iraqi soldiers to lay down their arms but remain in uniform. Instead of entire army units, U.S. troops often found empty uniforms neatly piled, even with rifles. Apparently Iraqi officers ordered their soldiers to simply go home.

Now, I’m an Iraqi soldier. I’m facing imminent defeat and I get one of these leaflets. The want me to lay down my arms, but remain in uniform. Should I also stamp STOOPID on my forehead? The first thought that would have gone through my head would have been, “they’re going to arrest us and try us or worse.”
I was and remain a strong proponent of the War in Iraq. Probably for different reasons. One being the very problem we’re facing in Afghanistan. Dating back to that military genius, Sun Tsu, it’s always better to pick the battlefield. If you’ve never read it, just Google Sun Tsu Terrain.

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@Aqua:

In my opinion, the Rumsfeld Doctrine was a failure and the Powell Doctrine should never have been tossed out.

How do you define “Rumsfeld Doctrine”?

If one were to apply the entire Powell checklist, it’d probably only apply to WWII; and that’s a recipe for inaction and a more dangerous world. Powell in 1990 opposed a show of force that might have deterred Saddam from invading Kuwait in the first place.

Part of the Powell Doctrine, from my understanding, entails that if ground forces win a battle, you go home (as happened in the Gulf War); the Powell Doctrine doesn’t include occupation duty, which is generally necessary after a big war.

As we all know, hindsight leans 20/20 and it’s easy to criticize after the fact, of all the missteps and what went wrong. You could have all the most insightful planning in the world, and things can still go hell-in-a-handbasket. There were as many things that went right and were anticipated and avoided as went wrong and not foreseen.

A lighter more mobile military is great if you’re going to fight in Grenada,

Yet, the success of Grenada is based upon the Powell Doctrine, using overwhelming force.

Part of the problem with Iraq is that the original idea was to model the post-war operations after Afghanistan, where the reigns of running the country would be handed over to Iraqis right away. The original idea was to liberate and not occupy; we had counted on the Iraqi army and police force to remain intact; didn’t happen. Our intell knowledge of Iraq’s infrastructure was inaccurate; things went wrong, just as they did in planning Operation Overlord. Rumsfeld might be an a-hole, and by his critics’ account, difficult to work with/under. I’m not even sure I’d like him on a personal level, were I to make his acquaintance. But I also think he had some brilliance along with his flaws and weaknesses.

And military officials are not without character and judgment flaws themselves.

Interestingly, in Richard Clarke’s book, he mentions how military officials sometimes let it filter down the ranks that civilian planners and politicians are to blame for certain war decisions, taking the heat off of themselves for actually making the (bad) decisions.

Retrieving this from a previous comment of mine, to save myself time of typing and thinking or researching:

The original idea was indeed “liberation not occupation”, and to model Iraq’s aftermath after Afghanistan and put an Iraqi face to the interim government as soon as possible.

Being the armchair general that I am, I think Rumsfeld’s streamlining of the military was brilliant; one of the hardest things to do is to move a bureaucracy to implement innovative changes and think outside the box. The decision to go in with a streamlined military force and make a sprint to Baghdad probably saved more American lives during major combat operations, with the Regime collapsing after a 3 week war. Recall that Saddam had begun rigging bridges, oil fields, and infrastructure as he had done during the first Gulf War. He was under the impression that he had more time to prepare, not anticipating the start-date of the war. Since the U.S. 4th Infantry Division wasn’t able to launch from Turkey, Saddam didn’t think the U.S. would start the invasion; not until the 4th ID was in place. Franks adapted to the setback, in a manner that Saddam failed to anticipate.

The other criticism often leveled at the Administration in regards to not enough boots on the ground, is in regards to “disbanding the Iraqi Army and police force”.

Bremer (yes, Bush’s man) seems to have unilaterally made that decision, himself. I’m aware of his letter to the NYTimes defending himself, but the accounts are all a convoluted mess to make sense of in regards to who is responsible for that decision.

Originally, for the purposes of liberation and not occupation, the White House and Pentagon did want to keep the Iraqi Army intact for post-war security.

Initial reports from Franks, too, indicates that leaflets were dropped telling personnel to stay in uniform, as the intent was to utilize them; but many didn’t. The Iraq army simply dissolved. Military personnel did come back looking for work and sheikhs also offering security work. Bremer screwed that one up. Of course, there was also the problem of corruption and lack of a real officer’s corp in the Iraq army to build from. There were elements of State and CIA that were never fully on board with the White House and Pentagon planning.

CENTCOM planners and Bill Luti had anticipated and averted almost every possible contingency except for the ones that did occur. I believe it was CIA that felt the police force and army would remain intact to provide security after the fall of the Regime. Didn’t happen. In his book, Franks said on April 10th, they ordered Iraqi troops “to remain in uniform at all times. Maintain unit integrity and good order and discipline in your units.”

“I wanted to see those defeated enemy troops kept in coherent units, commanded by their own officers, and paid in a combination of humanitarian assistance food and cash….[and] put to work for the Coalition on reconstruction.” As for the police, according to Luti, “the CIA told us that all we had to do was lop off the top layer of leadership, but when we did we found that the corruption went so deep that we had to start from scratch. Was that a mistake? You bet. But it was a mistake based on faulty intelligence.”

According to Luti, even though Bremer came to put out an order to disband the Iraqi Army, the Army had all but disbanded itself initially. Millions of leaflets were even dropped and warnings broadcast in Arabic by the Commando Solo aircraft for Iraqi soldiers to lay down their arms but remain in uniform. Instead of entire army units, U.S. troops often found empty uniforms neatly piled, even with rifles. Apparently Iraqi officers ordered their soldiers to simply go home.

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@ Wordsmith

I’ve read it. I also read how Rumsfeld was with senior officiers. He would make it his mission to humiliate them publicly. You can read about that in Thomas Barnett’s article in Esquire.
In my opinion, the Rumsfeld Doctrine was a failure and the Powell Doctrine should never have been tossed out. I’m sure Old Trooper would be more qualified to speak to this; but in my opinion, when you are dealing with military lives, you should put as much power in place as necessary to make sure that goal is reached. A lighter more mobile military is great if you’re going to fight in Grenada, but knowing what was going to happen in Iraq, that was not the answer. And yes, our military did a fantastic job in Iraq, I just think a more overwhelming force would have brought about a more immediate end to the insurgency.
I’m not saying Rumsfeld didn’t have some good ideas, I just think he was an a$$ clown overall. Especially for the way he treated senior officers.
And lastly, Shinseki says he didn’t invite them. They were his superiors. That is a serious breach of military protocol that I don’t believe a 4-star general would make. Maybe he was trying to save face or just keep the peace. I was honored in two ceremonies while I was in the Air Force. The first invitation that went out was to my commander, the second to my supervisor. The lowliest airman, private and sailor know that’s the deal.

As for you piece by Peter Feaver, I couldn’t agree more. I don’t agree very much with President Obama, but I think that should be the case no matter who is president.

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@Aqua #21:

Snubbing Gen. Shinseki at his retirement ceremony was a total Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz grade school tactic.

I thought I had read somewhere that this wasn’t an intentional snub, but one perceived as such; but I can’t find the link. Here’s an account from “By his Own Rules” by Bradley Graham (evenhanded book), pg 412:

“Rumsfeld, who was traveling in Europe en route to a NATO meeting, wasn’t in attendance. Nor was Wolfowitz. Their absence was interpreted by many as a snub, but Shinseki had not invited either of them.

After leaving office, Shinseki kept a strict public silence, telling associates that he didn’t want to criticize while soldiers were still fighting and dying in Iraq. In 2008, however, a copy emerged of a memo he had written to Rumsfeld just before leaving. In it, Shinseki offered what he called some “closing thoughts” on several of the controversies that had so roiled relations between the two men. “While our disagreements have been well-chronicled, and sometimes exaggerated, these professional disagreements were never personal, never disrespectful, and never challenged the foundational principle of civilian control of the military in our form of government,” the general wrote. “When the discussions were about the national security, I felt it was my duty to provide my best professional military advice.”

He said his February 2003 testimony estimating the forces required to stabilize postwar Iraq had been misinterpreted. “I didn’t believe there was a ‘right’ answer on the number of forces required to stabilie Iraq until the commander on the ground had the chance to conduct both his mission analysis and a troop to task assessment,” Shinseki wrote. He explained that he had deliberately chosen a high number in an effort to avoid imposing a “force cap” and foreclose options for Rumsfeld and Franks. It was unfortunate, he added, that he hadn’t had the opportunity to explain the rationale before the matter blew up into a public issue, although he noted that neither Rumsfeld nor Wolfowitz had ever discussed the issue with him “despite all the commentary in the press.”

Peter Feaver makes a nice point regarding leakage into the public arena:

It is not good to have a document like this leaked into the public debate before the President has made his decision. Whether you favor ramping up or ramping down or ramping laterally, as a process matter, the Commander-in-Chief ought to be able to conduct internal deliberations on sensitive matters without it appearing concurrently on the front pages of the Post. I assume the Obama team is very angry about this, and I think they have every right to be.

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Blast, McChrystal has that kind of character. Damn shame the Pretender in Chief does not. He is over 20 years service and can RETIRE. General Officers do not RESIGN. Only Private Sector or DOD Civilians resign. Or Presidents that are going to be under indictment like the Kenyan will be if the Feds investigate ACORN.

http://www.blackfive.net/main/2009/09/let-me-add-my-two-cents-to-the-mcchrystal-to-resign-chorus.html

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Three officers at the Pentagon and in Kabul told McClatchy that the McChrystal they know would resign before he’d stand behind a faltering policy that he thought would endanger his forces or the strategy.

If this were true… it would be great that a General would FINALLY stand up and risk their career and actually RESIGN when they did not agree with the policy of the government. I think if more did that before and during OIF we would not had as much problem in Iraq.

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Sunday at the Washington Post
Post Delayed Story on General’s Afghanistan Report
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/22/AR2009092203341.html

Later that Sunday:

“The President went on national television yesterday in a
record 5 appearances. When asked if he would increase
the number of troops in Afghanistan by the interviewers,
he said it was irrelevant, as General McChrystal had not
yet asked for those troops.”
http://oceanaris.wordpress.com/2009/09/21/cia-payback-on-afghanistan/

Was Obama able to lie because the Post delayed its reporting?

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