The CIA didn’t directly put UBL in power, but Milt Beardon (the CIA guy who headed the US support for Muj during Afghan war in 80′s+) was on History Channel and said, (para) ‘We didn’t sell the guns and things to him, but we asked the Saudis to do so, and the Pakistanis to do so.’

Ultimately, the point I was trying to make is that UBL and AQ are willing to work w secular entities (be it the CIA or IIS or KGB or FSB or ISI or whoever). AQ is a network of militant islamic extremist groups, people, and networks, but ain’t exclusive to fanatics.

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UBL had a record of working w the CIA

Scott, could you elaborate on this with specifics? I have been led to the assumption that the claims of bin Laden and the CIA ever working together (re: conspiratorial anti-American/non-interventionist over-reach belief: CIA created bin Laden) is a myth.

For instance, I have this from Richard Miniter:

The CIA-Bin Laden Myth
By: Richard Miniter / Fox News
Tuesday, September 23, 2003

The American government did NOT put bin Laden in power in Afghanistan.

Two years after the Sept. 11 attacks, no memorial service, cable-news talkfest or university seminar seemed to have been complete without someone emerging from the woodwork to wonder darkly why the CIA ever financed Usama bin Laden “in the first place.”

Everyone from Washington Post reporters to Michael Moore seems to buy some version of this.

It is time to lay to rest the nagging doubt held by many Americans that our government was somehow responsible for fostering bin Laden. It’s not true and it leaves the false impression that we brought the Sept. 11 attacks down on ourselves. While it is impossible to prove a negative, all available evidence suggests that bin Laden was never funded, trained or armed by the CIA.

Bin Laden himself has repeatedly denied that he received any American support. “Personally neither I nor my brothers saw any evidence of American help,” bin Laden told British journalist Robert Fisk in 1993. In 1996, Mr. Fisk interviewed bin Laden again. The arch-terrorist was equally adamant: “We were never, at any time, friends of the Americans. We knew that the Americans supported the Jews in Palestine and that they are our enemies.”

In the course of researching my book on Bill Clinton and bin Laden, I interviewed Bill Peikney, who was CIA station chief in Islamabad from 1984 to 1986, and Milt Bearden, who was CIA station chief from 1986 to 1989. These two men oversaw the disbursement for all American funds to the anti-Soviet resistance. Both flatly denied that any CIA funds ever went to bin Laden. They felt so strongly about this point that they agreed to go on the record, an unusual move by normally reticent intelligence officers. Mr. Peikney added in an e-mail to me: “I don’t even recall UBL [bin Laden] coming across my screen when I was there.”

There are many reasons to believe them. They knew where the money went. Both men have retired from the CIA; they have no motive to mouth an agency line. And no compelling evidence has emerged that the CIA ever paid bin Laden: no cancelled checks, no invoices, no government reports.

Those who contend that bin Laden received U.S. funds usually make the following argument: America financed the Afghan rebels, bin Laden was among the rebels, therefore, in one way or another, America gave money to bin Laden.

This ignores a key fact: There were two entirely separate rebellions against the Soviets, united only by a common communist enemy. One was financed by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states and was composed of Islamic extremists who migrated from across the Muslim world. They called themselves “Arab Afghans.” Bin Laden was among them. When the Saudis agreed to match U.S. contributions dollar-for-dollar, the sheikhs insisted that their funds go exclusively to the “Arab Afghans,” possibly including bin Laden. Meanwhile, U.S. funds went exclusively to the other rebellion, which was composed of native Afghans. Mr. Bearden told me: “I challenge anyone to give any proof that we gave one dollar to any Arab Afghans, let alone bin Laden.”

Even if the CIA wanted to pay “Arab Afghans” — which agency officials insist they did not — bin Laden would be a far from obvious choice. Bin Laden himself rarely left the safety of Pakistan’s northwestern cities and commanded few troops of his own. At the time, bin Laden was the Arab Afghan’s quartermaster, providing food and other supplies.

If a CIA officer tried to give money to bin Laden, he probably would not have lived through the experience. The arch-terrorist was known for his violent anti-Americanism. Dana Rohrabacher, now a Republican congressman from California, told me about a trip he took with the mujahideen in 1987. On that trek, his guide told him not to speak English for the next few hours because they were passing by bin Laden’s camp. “If he hears an American, he will kill you.”

Why is this myth of CIA support for bin Laden so persistent? Some find the myth persuasive because they do not know that America and Saudi Arabia funded two different sets of anti-Soviet fighters. Others on the anti-American left and right, in both Europe and America, find it oddly comforting. It gives solace to those who want to think the worst of us. The CIA-funding myth allows them to return to a familiar pattern, to blame America first. Whatever the cause, this myth weakens America’s case for the war on terror by setting up a moral equivalency between America and Al Qaeda. This animates protests at home and makes it harder to win allies abroad.

When former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani learned that a Saudi prince had blamed U.S. policies for the Sept. 11 atrocity, he famously turned down the prince’s $10 million donation. His words at the time could be applied to the myth of CIA support for bin Laden: “There is no moral equivalent for this attack,” he said. “Not only are these statements wrong, they’re part of the problem.”

Peter Bergen:

The story about bin Laden and the CIA — that the CIA funded bin Laden or trained bin Laden — is simply a folk myth. There’s no evidence of this. In fact, there are very few things that bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and the U.S. government agree on. They all agree that they didn’t have a relationship in the 1980s. And they wouldn’t have needed to. Bin Laden had his own money, he was anti-American and he was operating secretly and independently. The real story here is the CIA did not understand who Osama was until 1996, when they set up a unit to really start tracking him.

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Scott, the IDA report I am talking about is the one written by Kevin Woods back in March of 2008. There were a few posts in this blog about the report. Particularly about how McClatchy News started an echo chamber on the false notion that it claimed there were ties between Al Qaeda and the Ba’ath government.

Here is a URL if you still need more clarification on what report I am talking about.

- http://regimeofterror.com/archives/2008/03/media_swings_and_misses_on_ida_1/

As for doubt about the matter regarding Ba’ath party militants (Saddam and his loyalists) working with Al Qaeda, there is plenty of doubt on this issue. Particularly for people who do not read about it and have already decided that they do not believe Saddam had any ties to Al Qaeda.

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Good questions Ryan. Looking back 13yrs, it’s tricky to say the least. The big thing in 1996 was the merging of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (which the FBI says had operational ties to Saddam’s govt-I’ll have to look at their website to get the exact wording) with Al Queda’s leadership councils. PLUS UBL was booted from Sudan, almost assassinated, refused sanctuary in Saudi, and fled to Afghanistan where-purely coincidentally(?) the Taliban then suddenly took power over all the other fighting factions. There are also several accounts from 1996 that UBL met w Iraqi officials. I dunno about those. Seems more like IIS guys making contact w UBL and AQ to me. Lastly, in 1996 AQ switched from jihad around the world to jihad that focused on killing Americans-including civilians.

Now, in 1994 we’re told that (per the 1998 UBL indictment-original version) that AQ setup a relationship w Saddam’s govt to get WMD. AQ wanted WMD, IIS obviously wanted something in return. That brings about the absolute core of the argument against the issue of regime ties: ignorant people tell us that Saddam and UBL never would have worked together because of religious differences. Saddam had a long record of using Islamic fanatics to do deniable, proxy attacks (all leaders in the region have this record), and UBL had a record of working w the CIA, ISI, etc (surely…they’re more “secular” than Saddam). More importantly, however, the issue isn’t the presence or depth of a love affair between Saddam and Bin Laden, but rather a willingness of the IIS to work[use] w AQ and vice versa.

For specifics re Zawahiri/IIS in 1996…I’ll have to do some lookin’. You’re right, I don’t have anything in the timeline about that; this period talks about “UBL” and/or “AQ” rather than the Z man himself. There’s stuff about the Z man and IIS BEFORE 1996, and lots after. I suspect it’s because in 1996…we just didn’t have anyone looking. Remember the findings of the 2001 Joint House/Senate Intel Committee Investigation into 911: prior to 911, there were never more than 4-40 people in the CIA watching all of AQ, and very few watching Iraq.

IDA report? Link? If you’re talking about the docs, I go w Mata’s suggestion of reading the Iraqi Perspectives Project report. Additionally, regimeofterror is a great website for this, AND the docs already found and reported on….leave simply no doubt about the matter anymore.

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Also, the people at the I.D.A. said in their March 2008 report that they are still looking into intel collected from Iraq and that they only have analyzed a few of them so far. Is there any word on whether they found anything else yet?

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Hi Scott, do you mind pointing me out to the part where it says Zawahiri got help from Saddam in 1996? Sorry, I was looking at the excel file you sent me, and there is so much that sometimes I lose my place. Thanks.

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Very welcome, Ryan.

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Thanks Mataharley and Scott.

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Ironically the media today has the nerve to tell its drone audiences that Ibn Sheikh al Libi was the only member of al Qaeda linking the group to Saddam. Beyond disgusting, partisan and ignorant our media is.

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Ryan, I sent you the Excel spreadsheet I have which has the links/sources for the following, but…this is what I’ve got for 1993. Hope this helps. If anyone else wants my timeline (1974-2005), lemme know.
-Scott

1/1/93 Evidence of Iraq’s involvement in terrorist attacks on the United States may have been available long before 9-11. Ramsi Yousef, the mastermind of the first World Trade Center attack in the parking garage, first came to America on an Iraqi passport. Phone records showed calls by Yousef to Baghdad. 

1/1/93 Iraq refuses to allow UNSCOM to use its own aircraft in Iraq. Iraq begins incursions into the de-militarised zone with Kuwait, and increases its military activity in the no-fly zones. The U.N. Security Council states that Iraq’s actions were an “unacceptable and material” breach of Resolution 687 and warns Iraq of “serious consequences.” Shortly thereafter, the United States, UK, and France launch air raids on southern Iraq. 

circa 1/1/93 Sometime in early 1993, Bin Laden sent Mohammed Atef to Mogadishu, Somalia to train people how to bring down helicopters with RPG’s as was done by the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan when they fought the Soviets.

circa 1/1/93 [throughout the 1990's] Bin Laden met at least eight times with officers of Iraq’s Special Security Organization, a secret police agency run by Saddam’s son Qusay, and met with officials from Saddam’s mukhabarat, its external intelligence service, according to intelligence made public by Secretary of State Colin Powell, who was speaking before the United Nations Security Council on February 6, 2003. 

1/1/93 References to procurement of false passports from Iraq and offers of safe haven previously have surfaced in CIA source reporting considered reliable. Intelligence reports to date have maintained that Iraqi support for al Qaeda usually involved providing training, obtaining passports, and offers of refuge. This report adds to that list by including weapons and money. This assistance would make sense in the aftermath of 9-11.

circa 1/1/93 1993—al-Qaeda acquires a private plane and sends a pilot to Airman Flight School in Oklahoma in the first instance of Osama bin Laden’s interest in aviation. Link

circa 1/1/93 1993— MOUSSAOUI starts to attend classes at a London trade school, South Bank University.

circa 1/1/93 Osama bin Laden had dealings with Iraqi Intelligence as early as 1993 in Somalia. During that period, various militant Islamic groups, to include bin Laden and Iraqi intelligence and military operatives, were in Somalia to organize, train and mobilize radical factions within the Somali populace. (NOTE: Bin Laden claimed this, and it wasn’t until late in the Clinton Administration that it was proven. Mohammed Atef-then AQ’s military commander and #3 man-went to Somalia and trained warlords in the techniques developed in Afghanistan for bringing down helicopters with RPG’s. The result was in fact that the now infamous Black Hawk Down battle came from Somalis trained by Al Queda…exactly as Bin Laden claimed.)

1/1/93 War in Bosnia continues, as “ethnic cleansing” spreads. NATO threatens airstrikes to defend “safe areas” created to protect Muslims.

circa 1/1/93 A senior defector, one of Saddam’s former intelligence chiefs in Europe, says Saddam sent his agents to Afghanistan sometime in the mid-1990s to provide training to al-Qaida members on document forgery.

circa 1/1/93 We know members of both organizations met repeatedly and have met at least eight times at very senior levels since the early 1990s. In 1996, a foreign security service tells us that bin Laden met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official in Khartoum and later met the director of the Iraqi intelligence service.

circa 1/1/93 Egypt and Sudan at loggerheads over territorial rights to Halaib, prompted by Sudan granting oil exploration concession. Each accuses the other of harbouring opposition elements.

circa 1/1/93 Iraqi MiG-23 aircraft that fled to Iran in the Gulf War have allegedly been refitted by Iran for use by the Sudanese air force against the SPLA in South Sudan. Lt-Gen Abdel Rahman Said, former army deputy chief of staff and now leading the Sudanese opposition Armed Forces Legitimate Command, says Baghdad was a party to the deal, and that the MiGs – ‘the only type of Iraqi plane that Sudan can maintain’ would go back to Iraq after an unspecified period. He claims Iran has delivered “between 60 and 90 tanks” to Khartoum, as well as long-range howitzers, ammunition and lorries.

1/1/93 In 1993, Iraq sent additional chemical weapons to Sudan, this time through Iran.

1/1/93 *”American intelligence believes that Al Qaeda and Saddam reached a non-aggression agreement in 1993, and that the relationship deepened further in the mid-nineteen-nineties, when an Al Qaeda operative – a native-born Iraqi who goes by the name Abu Abdullah al-Iraqi – was dispatched by bin Laden to ask the Iraqis for help in poison-gas training. Al-Iraqi’s mission was successful, and an unknown number of trainers from an Iraqi secret-police organization called Unit 999 were dispatched to camps in Afghanistan to instruct Al Qaeda terrorists. (Training in hijacking techniques was also provided to foreign Islamist radicals inside Iraq, according to two Iraqi defectors quoted in a report in the Times in November of 2001.)” The parenthetic reference to a November 2001 NY Times article, which describes the Salman Pak terrorist training camp outside Baghdad, is notable. A ruling by a Federal Court against the Iraqi regime on behalf of two families of those who died on September 11, 2001 was based partially on that training.

circa 1/1/93 In 1993, the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) directed and pursued an attempt to assassinate, through the use of a powerful car bomb, former U.S. President George Bush and the Emir of Kuwait. Kuwaiti authorities thwarted the terrorist plot and arrested 16 suspects, led by two Iraqi nationals. 

circa 1/1/93 American intelligence believes that Al Qaeda and Saddam reached a non-aggression agreement in 1993, and that the relationship deepened further in the mid-nineteen-nineties, when an Al Qaeda operative – a native-born Iraqi who goes by the name Abu Abdullah al-Iraqi – was dispatched by bin Laden to ask the Iraqis for help in poison-gas training. Al-Iraqi’s mission was successful, and an unknown number of trainers from an Iraqi secret-police organization called Unit 999 were dispatched to camps in Afghanistan to instruct Al Qaeda terrorists. (Training in hijacking techniques was also provided to foreign Islamist radicals inside Iraq, according to two Iraqi defectors quoted in a report in the Times in November of 2001.) The parenthetic reference to a November 2001 NY Times article, which describes the Salman Pak terrorist training camp outside Baghdad, is notable. A ruling by a Federal Court against the Iraqi regime on behalf of two families of those who died on September 11, 2001 was based partially on that training.”

1/8/93 UNSC presidential statement terms Iraqi restrictions of UN aircraft a material breach of RES 687

1/10/93 Iraq removes equipment from the Kuwaiti side of DMZ

1/11/93 UNSC presidential statement condemns Iraq for material breach of RES 687 in preventing UNSCOM from flying its own aircraft

1/13/93 US, UK, France conduct air raids on Iraqi anti-aircraft missile sites and radar bases in southern Iraq

1/17/93 US fires missiles at industrial complex in suburban Baghdad

1/18/93 US and UK launch air raids against radar sites in southern and northern Iraq

1/19/93 Iraq agrees to allow UNSCOM flights in Iraq.

1/21/93 An F-16 and an F-4G escorting a French Mirage reconnaissance plane over northern Iraq attack an Iraqi missile battery after the site’s search radar began tracking them.

1/22/93 An F-4G fires two missiles at a surface-to-air-missile (SAM) site in northern Iraq.

2/1/93 February 1993 Yazdi, Turabi, and Bashir present their plans to Iranian terror experts in a meeting in Khartoum, Sudan. The Iranians approve, and the attacks are ordered to proceed.

2/3/93 Iraqi gunners fire at a U.S. aircraft on routine patrol over northern Iraq.

2/5/93 UNSC adopts RES 806 allowing UNIKOM to take direct action to prevent or redress violations in DMZ

2/26/93 [1993 World Trade Center bomber ] Ramsi Yousef (aka “Rashid the Iraqi”) flees the United States to Pakistan on a fake Pakistani passport with the name Abdul Basit (A Kuwaiti missing since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait)

2/26/93 World Trade Center bombed by Al Queda

2/26/93 The Iraqis, who had the Third World’s largest poison-gas operations prior to the Gulf War I, have perfected the technique of making hydrogen-cyanide gas, which the Nazis called Zyklon-B. In the hands of al Qaeda, this would be a fearsome weapon in an enclosed space — like a suburban mall or subway station-this same form of cyanide was found in the 1993 WTC attack residue and in the seized bomb-making storage unit.  It was also found in the Euphrates River by advancing US Marines South of Baghdad in 2003

3/1/93 Spring 1993 Mohammed Farah Aidid meets with Iraqi intelligence officials in the Iraqi embassy. Baghdad promises to aid him in his fight against the Americans with the explicit intent of turning Somalia into another Vietnam for the Americans.

3/1/93 Spring 1993 Saddam Hussein viewed the operations against the Americans in Somalia important enough to nominate his son Qusay to personally supervise them. The other elements of anti-American operations apparently didn’t support this idea. Those other elements included Bin Laden and his Afghan Arabs, the Iranian-backed Al Quds forces, the Iranian Pasadran, and the Sudanese. Iraqi intelligence reported that Saddam wanted a “Mother-of-all Battles victory in Somalia.” After these reports and after Qusay’s nomination, the Iraqi embassy in Khartoum, Sudan was expanded by the addition of several different Iraqi special intelligence services branches and special security branches. Those new additions were under the control of Sudan’s leader Hasan al-Turabi.

3/4/93 [1993 World Trade Center bomber ] Salameh is arrested for his part in the WTC bombing

3/5/93 [1993 World Trade Center bomber ] Abdul Rahman Yasin flees the United States for Iraq where he lives peacefully until his CBS interview years later.

3/31/93 The UN Security Council passed Resolution 816 authorising enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina and extending the ban to cover flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft except those authorised by UNPROFOR. In the event of further violations, it authorised UN member states to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance. An enforcement operation, called “Deny Flight”, began on 12 April 1993. It initially involved some 50 fighter and reconnaissance aircraft (later increased to over 100) from various Alliance nations, flying from airbases in Italy and from aircraft carriers in the Adriatic. By the end of December 1994, over 47,000 sorties had been flown by fighter and supporting aircraft.

circa 4/1/93 Kuwaiti Intelligence discovers an Iraqi IIS plot to assassinate former President George Bush. [Author's note: in keeping with the tactic of a state-sponsor of terrorism, the attack was to have been carried out by terrorists not IIS operatives.]

4/9/93 Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery sites fire on Provide Comfort aircraft near the Saddam dam in northern Iraq.

4/14/1993 “Failed Iraqi plot to assassinate Bush family in Kuwait; In fact, if the intelligence George W. was given was correct, he might have lost nearly his entire immediate family, including his father, mother, wife, and two brothers. Just as he sought to avenge his father’s political loss, he would one day go after the man accused of attempting to murder his father and the rest of the family. “”After all,”" he would later comment, when speaking of the Iraqi leader at a Houston fundraiser, “”this is the guy who tried to kill my dad.”"

…As the giant plane took off from Houston’s Ellington Field on April 14, the only passengers were former President Bush, his wife Barbara, their two sons Marvin and Neil, his wife Sharon, and Laura Bush. Her husband, George W. Bush, who had always avoided foreign travel, stayed home to oversee his interest in the Texas Rangers baseball team and to make preparations for his run for the governorship.”

4/18/93 An Iraqi radar site illuminates two U.S. F-4Gs flying north of the 36th parallel. The site was south of the parallel. One of the aircraft fires an AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missile at the tracking radar and destroyed it.

5/27/93 UNSC adopts RES 833 reaffirming Kuwaiti border issues in RES 733; guarantees inviolability of border

circa 6/1/93 In June 1993, NATO Foreign Ministers decided to offer protective air power for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the performance of its overall mandate. In July, NATO aircraft began flying training missions for providing such Close Air Support (CAS).

6/4/93 The U.S. conducts air strikes against Iraqi intelligence service, in retaliation for evidence linking the Iraqi government to the assassination plot against former president George Bush.

6/4/93 24 Pakistani Peacekeepers in Somalia are ambushed, shot to death, skinned, and their remains paraded through the streets by a mob. [Author's note: in 1994/95 it is revealed by the Sudanese govt that an Al Queda operative based in The Sudan, and several other Al Queda operatives including #3 man Mohammed Atef, had gone to Somalia, trained Somalis in tactics that had been learned during the fight against Soviets in Afghanistan, and had they themselves taken part in this attack.]

6/10/93 Iraq refuses to allow emplacement of UN monitoring cameras at weapons facilities

6/18/93 UNSC presidential statement terms Iraq’s refusal of cameras material breach of RES 687, warns of serious consequences

6/24/93 A wave of arrests in NYC prevents a followup attack to the 1993 WTC attack. The relationships of the conspirators in both attacks are completely intertwined. The second attack was to focus on the UN headquarters, tunnels, and bridges in NYC.

6/27/93 U.S. missile strike is launched against Baghdad on basis of “compelling evidence” that Iraq was involved in the April 1993 assassination attempt on former President Bush in Kuwait.

6/27/93 US launches cruise missile at Iraqi intelligence headquarters in retaliation for assassination plot against former President Bush [a plot that had been discovered 3-4 months earlier] [Author's note: while Clinton Administration officials deny that the retaliation strike was tied to the 6/24 wave of arrests in NYC or the 1993 WTC attack, the retaliation strike was the only US attack ever conducted against Iraq with so little warning and military preparation. It was also the only attack to be conducted completely unilaterally (without even the support of the UK), and it was the fdirst attack to draw massive international condemnation despite the claim that it was in retaliation for a terrorist attack that would often be deemed an act of war.]

6/28/93 UNSC presidential statement criticizes Iraqi statements on boundary demarcation

6/29/93 A Southern Watch F-4G fires an anti-radar missile at an anti-aircraft artillery site after the Iraqis illuminated it and another F-4G patrolling the southern no-fly zone.

7/1/93 A lengthy stand-off takes place between the Iraqi government and U.N. inspectors over Iraq’s refusal to allow inspectors to monitor two missile test sites south of Baghdad. U.N. monitors are withdrawn.

7/19/93 Iraq agrees to emplacement of monitoring cameras following Rolf Ekeus visit to Baghdad

7/29/93 In separate incidents, two U.S. Navy EA-6Bs, part of Joint Task Force Southwest Asia, fire anti-radar missiles at Iraqi SAM sites after being illuminated by the sites’ surveillance radars.

circa 8/1/93 8/93 Unsuccessful attampt by the Al-Jihad organization to assassinate Interior Minister Hassan al Alfi of Egypt.

8/4/93 Abdul Rahman is indicted for his part in the 1993 WTC bombing.

8/8/93 A U.S. HUMMV hits a land mine in a pothole in Somalia. The mine was remote detonated. 4 American MP’s were killed. [Author's note: in 1994/95 it is revealed by the Sudanese govt that an Al Queda operative based in The Sudan, and several other Al Queda operatives including #3 man Mohammed Atef, had gone to Somalia, trained Somalis in tactics that had been learned during the fight against Soviets in Afghanistan, and had they themselves taken part in this attack.]

8/19/93 Two U.S. F-16s report possible SA-3 missile launches west of Mosul and respond with cluster bombs. Two F-15s drop four laser-guided bombs on the site an hour later.

8/22/93 A bomb explodes near a U.S. Army HUMMV destroying the vehicle and seriously wounding 6 American soldiers. [Author's note: in 1994/95 it is revealed by the Sudanese govt that Al Queda operatives including #3 man Mohammed Atef, had gone to Somalia, trained Somalis in tactics that had been learned during the fight against Soviets in Afghanistan, and had they themselves taken part in this attack.]

9/1/93 Fall 1993 Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri is in Somalia acting as field commander of the “Afghan Arabs” and coordinator between those fighters, Iraqi fighters, Iranian intelligence, and the various Somali warlords….all against the US/UN forces.

9/1/93 [Fall 1993] “The Iraqis organized the heavy weapons, mainly the dual-use 23mm guns and RPG-7s, which were used primarily against the U.S. helicopters. The Iraqis were also instrumental in running the external perimeter, blocking repeated U.S.-U.N. attempts to relieve the beseiged force in the defensive perimeter. The Arab “Afghans” were in command of some of the Somali blocking forces as well. Reports conflict as to the extent of Iraqi participation in the actual fighting. A few [Iraqi] Saiqah Commando troops were definately present, giving instructions to [Somali] SIUP fighters.”

9/1/93 By the Fall of 1993, a large number of Iraqis moved into the area of the Red Sea mountain range — in Madabay in Khawr Ashraf, Port Sudan, in the region of Dalawat on the Red Sea near Hala’ib, and the city of Tawker in region of Karnakanat. The Iraqis brought into these installations high-tech equipment and computers, missiles, defense systems, anti-aircraft systems and radar systems.

9/14/93 Major General Thomas Montegomery in Somalia asks for reinforcements to create an emergency rapid reaction force in Mogadishu. The request is scaled down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but approved.

9/23/93 Sec.Def. Les Aspin vetos the request for heavy armor to be sent to Mogadishu

9/25/93 An American UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter is shot down in Mogadishu, Somalia. The crew is rescued. [Author's note: in 1994/95 it is revealed by the Sudanese govt that Al Queda operatives including #3 man Mohammed Atef, had gone to Somalia, trained Somalis in tactics that had been learned during the fight against Soviets in Afghanistan, and had they themselves taken part in this attack.]

circa 10/1/93 After the 8/22 bombing of a U.S. Army HUMMV, U.S. Army Task Force Ranger and Delta Force commandos make 6 raids trying to kill/capture Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid. All fail publicly. [Author's note: in 1994/95 it is revealed by the Sudanese govt that Al Queda operatives including #3 man Mohammed Atef, had gone to Somalia, trained Somalis in tactics that had been learned during the fight against Soviets in Afghanistan, and had they themselves taken part in this attack.]

circa 10/1/93 Sudan is added to the U.S. State Department’s list of nations that support terrorism. [Author's note: this occurs at the same time as Sudanese intelligence officials were notifying the US of Al Queda terrorists based in Sudan and operating freely in Somalia against US forces. While there is no direct and/or public response toward Al Queda, the Sudan suffers publicly and economically as a supporter of international terrorism]

10/3/93 U.S. Task Force Ranger makes another daring daylight raid using the same tactics as the 6 earlier raids. This raid captures 22 leaders in Aidid’s organization. During the raid, a U.S. Army ranger falls from a hovering helicopter-halting the operation. While the operation is halted, two Blackhawk helicopters are shot down by Somalis with RPG’s. 18 Americans are killed. Eighty-four Americans are wounded. Two American Delta Force snipers volunteered to protect one of the downed helicopter crews until reinforcements could arrive. They were eventually overwhelmed by thousands of Somalis and killed. Their bodies mutilated and dragged through the streets. Shocking video from a French camera crew is shown around the world within hours of the debacle. One of the pilots protected by the Delta Force snipers is captured. Both Delta snipers received the Congressional Medal of Honor. Somali casualties will never be determined as the nation was in a complete state of anarchy. However, Red Crescent reports state that as many as 3000 were killed and somewhere between 5000 and 10,000 were wounded.

circa 10/3/93 “On 3 and 4 October, 1993, operatives of Al Queda particpated in the attack on U.S. military personnell serving in Somalia.”

10/20/93 President Clinton announces the withdrawl of all US troops from Somalia by 3/31/94

circa 11/1/93 11/93 – Unsuccessful attampt by the Al-Jihad organization to assassinate Prime Minister Atef Sedky of Egypt.

11/1/1993 Chalabi presents Clinton administration with war plan entitled “The End Game”

11/1/1993 In November of 1993, Ahmad Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress, an opposition group devoted to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, presented the Clinton Administration with a detailed, four-phase war plan entitled “The End Game,” along with an urgent plea for money to finance it. “The time for the plan is now,” Chalabi wrote. “Iraq is on the verge of spontaneous combustion. It only needs a trigger to set off a chain of events that will lead to the overthrow of Saddam.” It was a message that Chalabi would repeat for the next eight years.

11/10/93 11/10/1993 John Kerry voted to cut intel spending

11/12/93 The New York Times reports that the Iraqi government forces have stepped up military pressure against Shiite villages in southern Iraq forcing thousands to flee deeper into the marshes or across the border into Iran.

11/16/93 Iraqi demonstrators cross into Kuwaiti territory protesting border demarcation

11/23/93 UNSC presidential statement terms Iraqi border violations breach of RES 687

11/26/93 Iraq accepts UN Security Council Resolution 715.

11/26/93 Iraq accepts RES 715

12/1/93 By late 1993, the regions surrounding these installations were experiencing strict security measures and 24-hour armed patrols roam around it. In some areas, such as in the Port Sudan area, shepherds and nomads were completely removed from security zones with a 60 km circumference.

12/21/93 Iraqi troops fire on a U.S. patrol near Faydah in northern Iraq. The patrol is within the security zone established on May 22, 1991. The Iraqis were over a mile away and outside the security zone. Baghdad denies Western reports of the incident as “fabricated and baseless.”

12/31/93 While the initial movements of WMD stuff were emergency measures or by- products of other considerations, Baghdad reexamined its posture by late 1993. By then, Saddam Hussein had already realized that the UN inspections were not going away, and that the US remained determined to continue the policy of containment and sanctions. Moreover, the US retaliation for the June 1993 narrowly averted an attempt on the life of former President Bush by Iraqi intelligence convinced Baghdad that there would be no reconciliation with the US in the foreseeable future. Hence, Baghdad adopted a long term strategy to endure the global pressure.

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