[...] for a life, couldn’t bring herself to say anything positive about the troops.  This after Obama and the AP have declared the surge a success, that, according to Obama, were the result of [...]

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Excellent linked article Rich Casebolt.

Please note that it shows that both BHO and JSM misrepresented the genesis of the Sunni Awakening.

BHO by suggesting the sheiks were motivated by fear of an imminent US withdrawal, when in fact Col McFarland indicates it was just the opposite.

JSM by suggesting the Awakening was a creature of the Surge, when in fact it substantially predated it. [Col McFarland dates the birth of the Awakening in September 2006]

. . .Colonel McFarlane [phonetic] was contacted by one of the major Sunni sheiks. Because of the surge we were able to go out and protect that sheik and others. And *it began the Anbar awakening.* I mean, that’s just a matter of history.

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The sad thing about the many, many misspoken statements, outright lies, and “that’s not what I said, meant, suggested, inferred, whispered, garbled, stuttered, muttered” moments, is that many Americans are too lazy to learn the truth about Barak Obama for themselves.

Depressing.

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From Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point, written by Men who know what went down (emphasis added):

We also took a different IO tack with the sheiks. Instead of telling them that we would leave soon and they must assume responsibility for their own security, we told them that we would stay as long as necessary to defeat the terrorists. That was the message they had been waiting to hear. As long as they perceived us as mere interlopers, they dared not throw in their lot with ours. When they began to think of us as reliable partners, their attitudes began to change. Still, we had to prove that we meant what we were saying.

Clearly, a combination of factors, some of which we may not yet fully understand, contributed to this pivotal success. As mentioned before, the enemy overplayed its hand and the people were tired of Al-Qaeda. A series of assassinations had elevated younger, more aggressive tribal leaders to positions of influence. A growing concern that the U.S. would leave Iraq and leave the Sunnis defenseless against Al-Qaeda and Iranian-supported militias made these younger leaders open to our overtures. Our willingness to adapt our plans based on the advice of the sheiks, our staunch and timely support for them in times of danger and need, and our ability to deliver on our promises convinced them that they could do business with us. Our forward presence kept them reassured. We operated aggressively across all lines of operation, kinetic and non-kinetic, to bring every weapon and asset at our disposal to bear against the enemy. We conducted detailed intelligence fusion and targeting meetings and operated seamlessly with special operations forces, aviation, close air support, and riverine units. We have now seen this model followed by other BCTs in other parts of Iraq, and it has proved effective. Indeed, the level of sophistication has only improved since the Ready First departed in February 2007. Although, perhaps groundbreaking at the time, most of our tactics, techniques, and procedures are now familiar to any unit operating in Iraq today.

The Big 0 was, at most only partially correct in his assessment of the situation … and had his views been implemented as policy, the Awakening would have died in its infancy.

Here are more lessons the Big 0 needs to learn:

The most enduring lessons of Ramadi are ones that are most easily lost in technical and tactical discussions, the least tangible ones. The most important lessons we learned were —

Accept risk in order to achieve results.
(As opposed to leave now?)

Once you gain the initiative, never give the enemy respite or refuge.
(As opposed to leaving before the free people of Iraq can independently carry on in this?)

Never stop looking for another way to attack the enemy.
(Or is that, “withdraw from the enemy”?)

The tribes represent the people of Iraq, and the populace represents the “key terrain” of the conflict. The force that supports the population by taking the moral high ground has as sure an advantage in COIN as a maneuver commander who occupies dominant terrain in a conventional battle. (As opposed to the “non-judgmentalism” that treats dictator and democrat with the same deference, as seen in the UN and much of our own State Department?)

And a lesson for all those who think that “brown people” are incapable of forming a civil society, and therefore tell us that a strongman is necessary for “peace” in Iraq …

No matter how imperfect the tribal system appeared to us, it was capable of providing social order and control through culturally appropriate means where governmental control was weak.

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Here’s an interesting read on the surge – and what went before…

http://www.americanthinker.com/2008/07/the_complex_success_of_the_sur.html

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What with the presence of its cheerleading fellow travelers in the so-called MSM, the left has carte blanche to make up its own “facts”. That makes politics a pretty easy game. It also makes the future of this nation extremely dicey. Especially when it seems the Amercian people have become too lazy, too stupid, too ignorant or just too uncaring to do anything about it.

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when the dems were elected in 06 it sacred the shia out of the sunni,so they went along w/the program to clean thier act up.just guessin.it scares the hell out me to have them(dems) involed with anything.

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[...] And that’s why I will send a clear signal to the Iraqi government. They will have ample time to get their act together, to actually pass an oil law, which has been — they’ve been talking about now for years. [emphasis added] Flopping Aces [...]

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He has even caused Ms Couric to admit on camera to being confused as to his position on the Surge. Since I don’t watch CBS, I wonder if that was on their broadcast.

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typical…
demorat tactics…
anyone really surprised???

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