[...] Senators Caught Distorting and Misleading Intelligence Report [...]

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Oscar a teacher? No wonder the “dumbing down of America” is successful….

Education should be about teaching independent thought, and how to form educated opinions. It is not about pushing an instructor’s beliefs onto the class. So the question is: Will he inspire his students to look for the original source materials (as we provided here for his convenience) to read for themselves everything in it’s entirety?

Or will his students, like him, depend upon so called jouralist “interpretations” of the source documents because it’s easier?

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My students are going to really enjoy reading this series of comments. Thank you very much for your participation.

Take care,
Oscar

Oscar, Oscar. Hold on just a sec….

No need to dash off so quickly. We were just getting started.

Personally, I was convinced that you would at least attempt some feeble effort toward defending your position and arguments but then again, after the way you got your ass handed to you, I cannot really blame you for wanting to slink away quietly.

The burden of having your arguments eviscerated, disassembled at the joints, and stacked neatly in the corner must have been just too much for you to face.

I thought you were going to be something different, Oscar. Something special.

As it turns out, you’re just ordinary.

Oh well.

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Oscar, interesting comments across the board. Let’s check the dates and the sources though if we can.

You make an interesting point about Pavit (CIA) looking into regime ties to AQ between
Sept 11, 2001
and
Sept 21, 2001

You also make an interesting point about DCI Tenet looking into regime ties to AQ in the same period.

There are several problems here.
1) Just because Pavit, others in CIA, and even DCI Tenet were dubious of regime ties does not automatically mean that either the matter was fully investigated in the Sept 11, 2001 to March 17, 2003 period. Your point is only in reference to the chaotic days immediately after the 911 attacks-days in which many still didn’t believe the carefully planned, prepared, orchestrated, and timed attacks could possibly be Al Queda. Even the Israeli Mossad-which arguably had the best intelligence service re the region at the time-didn’t believe it was UBL and AQ.
2) Making statements about how Pavitt, Tenet, or others (I can list a dozen or more if desired) couldn’t believe the reports of regime ties to AQ only means that those people were skeptical. It doesn’t mean anyone reported that skeptism to VP Cheney, or that he should have been skeptical. Quite the contrary-immediately after the 911 attacks (and to this day) many believe the Bush Administration was too skeptical about intelligence reports about AQ, and should have been less skeptical/taken more action on the pre-911 intelligence reports…vague as they were.
3) MOST IMPORTANTLY, the intelligence regarding regime ties to Al Queda doesn’t hinge on the Prague meeting. Not at all. That’s just one of the hundreds of reports of the regime working with Al Queda. No doubt, not all intelligence reports are 100% accurate (that’s why they’re not called “Evidence Agencies”). By and large, most of the intelligence reports about pre-911, post-911/pre-OIF regime ties were accurate and indicated a long list of high level meetings between the regime and AQ. Post invasion intelligence has shown that hundreds of Iraqi leaders worked directly with AQ groups before the invasion.

Ultimately, Saddam and Bin Laden didn’t have to be snuggle-buggle, hand-holding lovers, or even friends. They didn’t even have to like each other any more than racist Hitler liked an Asian Tojo.

The biggest, most important tie between the regime and AQ isn’t Saddam and UBL, but the covert leadership of both entities, and the strategic exploitation of each other to further their own individual ends; ie the removal of US and western forces from the Middle East as well as their ally…Israel.

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My students are going to really enjoy reading this series of comments. Thank you very much for your participation.

Take care,
Oscar

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Well, since everyone else is joining in and doing Oscar’s work for him I’ll do my part.

From the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report that he was waving about in post #15.

Here’s the part Oscar quoted. The part he wanted us to see:

“There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or whether Iraq has – or will – establish its chemical warfare agent-production facilities.”

Oddly enough, that’s also the portion that was leaked to the press.

Imagine that.

Here is the part that Oscar didn’t quote. The part he didn’t want us to see:

The Defense Department released on June 7 an unclassified excerpt of
an earlier Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) study on Iraq’s chemical
warfare (CW) program in which it stated that there is “no reliable
information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical
weapons, or where Iraq has — or will — establish its chemical
warfare agent production facilities.”

But the excerpt, drawn from a classified DIA study published in
September 2002, also Stated that “Iraq will develop various elements
of its chemical industry to achieve self-sufficiency in producing the
chemical precursors required for CW agent production.” The full
excerpt is based on the DIA’s analysis titled: “Iraq — Key WMD
Facilities — An Operational Support Study.”

The official unclassified excerpt was leaked to the media on June 6.
Navy Admiral Lowell Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), stepped forward the same day to clarify his agency’s
2002 assessment of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, saying “DIA
joined in the intelligence community assessment … that they had a
weapons of mass destruction program in place.”

Jacoby made his remarks during a media availability on Capitol Hill at
the invitation of Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Chairman John
Warner (Republican, Virginia) following a closed hearing on the
missions of the 75th Exploitation Task Force and the Iraq Survey Group
– both of which are involved in the search for information relating
to Iraq’s WMD. Warner said Jacoby’s clarification — first made during
the closed committee session — had interest to the public at large.

Jacoby was responding to questions raised after the June 6 press
reports suggesting that in the lead-up to policy decisions about Iraqi
weapons capabilities, the DIA found there was no reliable information
that Iraq was producing and stockpiling chemical weapons. The DIA
director said the quote appearing in media reporting was actually a
single sentence lifted out of a much longer planning document.

“It talks about the fact that at the time, in September 2002, we could
not specifically pin down individual facilities operating as part of
the weapons of mass destruction programs, specifically, the chemical
warfare portion,” he said, according to an unofficial transcript of
the exchange with reporters. “It is not, in any way, intended to
portray the fact that we had doubts that such a program existed …
was active, or … was part of the Iraqi WMD infrastructure” Jacoby
added.

“We did not have doubts about the existence of the program,” the
director said. As of September 2002, he continued, “we could not
reliably pin down, for somebody who was doing contingency planning,
specific facilities, locations or production that was underway at a
specific location at that point in time.”

Asked if additional information surfaced about Iraq after September,
Jacoby said: “there was (a) continuing flow of information coming in
to us for analysis and assessment during that whole period.”

Prior to Jacoby’s clarification, media reporting about the DIA study
fueled a brewing controversy by suggesting that elements of the Bush
administration may have shaded or exaggerated existing intelligence
about Iraq’s WMD programs to gain support for the war in 2003.

Warner urged people to trust the administration “as we go forward to
search out” answers about Iraq’s WMD capabilities. “I would hope we
would have the opportunity to have public hearings to dispel whatever
doubts remain,” he said.

Warner went on to emphasize that committee members will draw their
conclusions about the reliability of the intelligence “only after a
very careful and methodical review of material, evidence of all types,
and testimony from a wide range of individuals.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman
General Richard Myers made remarks to reporters on June 5 during a
media stakeout following a meeting with House Intelligence Committee
members. Rumsfeld endorsed existing intelligence about Iraq and said
that he believes “that the presentation (to the United Nations) made
by Secretary Powell (February 5) was accurate and will be proved to be
accurate.”

Following is the unclassified excerpt of the 2002 DIA study:

(begin excerpt)

A substantial amount of Iraq’s chemical warfare agents, precursors,
munitions, and production equipment were destroyed between 1991 and
1998 as a result of Operation Desert Storm and UNSCOM (United Nations
Special Commission) actions. Nevertheless, we believe Iraq retained
production equipment, expertise and chemical precursors and can
reconstitute a chemical warfare program in the absence of an
international inspection regime. Iraq’s successful use of chemical
weapons in the past against Iranian troops and Kurdish civilians
increases the likelihood of a chemical warfare reconstitution. Iraq
has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and
stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has — or will –
establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities. Unusual
munitions transfer activity in mid-2002 suggests that Iraq is
distributing CW munitions in preparation for an anticipated U.S.
attack. Iraq retains all the chemicals and equipment to produce the
blister agent mustard but its ability for sustained production of
G-series nerve agents and VX is constrained by its stockpile of key
chemical precursors and by the destruction of all known CW production
facilities during Operation Desert Storm and during subsequent UNSCOM
inspections. In the absence of external aid, Iraq will likely
experience difficulties in producing nerve agents at the rate executed
before Operation Desert Storm.

Iraq is steadily establishing a dual use industrial chemical
infrastructure that provides some of the building blocks necessary for
production of chemical agents. In addition, Iraq has renovated and
added production lines at two facilities formerly associated with
Baghdad’s chemical warfare program — Habbaniyah I and Habbaniyah II.
Activities include building reconstruction, salvage operations, and
equipment movement and deliveries in the months that followed the 1998
expulsion of United Nations inspectors. Baghdad is rebuilding portions
of its chemical production infrastructure under the guise of a
civilian need for pesticides, chlorine, and other legitimate chemical
products, giving Iraq the potential for a small “breakout” production
capability.

Although we lack any direction information, Iraq probably possesses CW
agent in chemical munitions, possibly including artillery rockets,
artillery shells, aerial bombs, and ballistic missile warheads.
Baghdad also probably possesses bulk chemical stockpiles, primarily
containing precursors, but that also could consist of some mustard
agent or stabilized VX.

Iraqi doctrine for the use of chemical weapons evolved during the
Iran-Iraq war, and was fully incorporated into Iraqi offensive
operations by the end of the war in 1988. Iraq demonstrated its
ability to use chemical weapons during that conflict in the following
roles: in a defensive role to disrupt or halt an overwhelming enemy
offensive; as a preemptive weapon to disrupt staging areas before an
offensive attack; and as an offensive weapon during well-staged
attacks to regain territory. Authority for use of chemical weapons
during that war eventually became delegated to corps commanders. The
Iraqis delivered chemical agents with artillery, multiple rocket
launchers, mortars, and aerial bombs dropped by fixed-wing aircraft
and helicopters. Iraq also used chemical agents against Kurdish
civilians in 1988. Historical precedent suggests Saddam already may
have deployed chemical weapons to western Iraq, as he did during
Operation Desert Storm to be used against Israel in the event of
coalition military action that threatens the regime.

Iraq will develop various elements of its chemical industry to achieve
self-sufficiency in producing the chemical precursors required for CW
agent production. Iraq might construct a new dedicated CW facility or
facilities at remote sites to avoid detection or, alternatively,
upgrade the production capabilities at its Habbaniyah I and II
facilities to produce the agent mustard and binary components
necessary for the production of nerve agents.

Emphasis mine.

Oscar’s selective quoting is in italics.

This is the link to the original PDF.

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Oscar, when it comes to refuting “the facts” in your piece, it’s a matter of “where do I begin?” and “do I have the time and energy on my hands?”. A number of points you bring up are already addressed if you go through the FA archives. I know we’ve covered downing st memo, 16 sotu words, and on and on.

Oscar in comment #9:

Tenet put the Directorate of Operations Jim Pavitt on the case, who reported back to Tenet.

Pavitt’s one of those “shadow warriors” Kenneth Timmerman calls out by name in his book, as being anti-Bush.
Aye Chihuahua #16:

This “opinion piece” is filled with even more falsity than the “Cheney lied” meme you were trying to spin earlier.

A better opinion piece:

Prague Problem
One thing the staff evidently thought it was laying to rest was the other niggling matter of whether 9/11 major domo Mohammed Atta met with Iraqi intelligence officer Ahmed al-Ani in Prague in April 2001. The staff’s conclusion is that the meeting is a fiction. To say its reasoning is less than satisfying would be a gross understatement. Here’s the pertinent conclusion, also found in Statement Number 16:

We have examined the allegation that Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague on April 9 [2001]. Based on the evidence available — including investigation by Czech and U.S. authorities plus detainee reporting — we do not believe that such a meeting occurred. The FBI’s investigation places him in Virginia as of April 4, as evidenced by this bank surveillance camera shot of Atta withdrawing $8,000 from his account. Atta was back in Florida by April 11, if not before. Indeed, investigation has established that, on April 6, 9, 10, and 11, Atta’s cellular telephone was used numerous times to call Florida phone numbers from cell sites within Florida. We have seen no evidence that Atta ventured overseas again or re-entered the United States before July, when he traveled to Spain under his true name and back under his true name.

This is ground, again, that I’ve recently covered. To rehearse: Czech intelligence has alleged that Atta was seen in Prague on April 8 or 9, 2001. Atta had withdrawn $8,000 cash from a bank in Virginia on April 4 and was not eyeballed again by a witness until one week later, on April 11. The new detail added by the staff is that Atta’s cell phone was used in Florida on three days (April 6, 9 and 10) during that time frame. Does this tend to show he was in Florida rather than Prague? It could, but not very convincingly. Telling us Atta’s cell phone was used is not the same as telling us Atta used the cell phone.

Atta almost certainly would not have been able to use the cell phone overseas, so it would have been foolish to tote it along to the Czech Republic — especially if he was traveling clandestinely (as the large cash withdrawal suggests). He would have left it behind. Atta, moreover, had a roommate (and fellow hijacker), Marwan al-Shehhi. It is certainly possible that Shehhi — whom the staff places in Florida during April 2001 — could have used Atta’s cell phone during that time.

Is it possible that Atta was in Florida rather than Prague? Of course it is. But the known evidence militates strongly against that conclusion: an eyewitness puts Atta in Prague, meeting with al-Ani; we know Atta was a “Hamburg student” and represented himself as such in a visa application; it has been reported that the Czechs have al-Ani’s appointment calendar and it says he was scheduled to meet on the critical day with a “Hamburg student”; and we know for certain that Atta was in Prague under very suspicious circumstances twice in a matter of days (May 30 and June 2, 2000) during a time the Czechs and Western intelligence services feared that Saddam, through al-Ani, might be reviving a plot to use Islamic extremists to bomb Radio Free Europe (a plot the State Department acknowledged in its annual global terror report notwithstanding that the commission staff apparently did not think the incident merited mention).

I am perfectly prepared to accept the staff’s conclusion about Atta not being in Prague — if the commission provides a convincing, thoughtful explanation, which is going to have to get a whole lot better than a cell-phone record.

What is the staff’s reason for rejecting the eyewitness identification? Is the “Hamburg student” entry bogus? Since the staff is purporting to provide a comprehensive explanation of the 9/11 plot — the origins of which it traces back to 1999 — what is their explanation for what Atta was doing in Prague in 2000? Why, when the staff went into minute detail about the travels of other hijackers (even when it conceded it did not know the relevance of those trips), was Atta’s trip to Prague not worthy of even a passing mention? Why was it so important for Atta to be in Prague on May 30, 2000 that he couldn’t delay for one day, until May 31, when his visa would have been ready? Why was it so important for him to be in Prague on May 30 that he opted to go despite the fact that, without a visa, he could not leave the airport terminal? How did he happen to find the spot in the terminal where surveillance cameras would not capture him for nearly six hours? Why did he go back again on June 2? Was he meeting with al-Ani? If so, why would it be important for him to see al-Ani right before entering the United States in June 2000? And jumping ahead to 2001, if Atta wasn’t using cash to travel anonymously, what did he do with the $8000 he suddenly withdrew before disappearing on April 4? If his cell phone was used in Florida between April 4 and April 11, what follow-up investigation has been done about that by the 9/11 Commission? By the FBI? By anybody? Whom was the cell phone used to call? Do any of those people remember speaking to Atta at that time? Perhaps someone would remember speaking with the ringleader of the most infamous attack in the history of the United States if he had called to chat, no?

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Oscar, da fighting fish… Wouldn’t it be easier to just watch them kill their own, then pluck them out by hand??

UPDATE INRE Dave Gaubatz… thought name looked familiar, but I read so little of his stuff. Apparently doesn’t make it into my internet path often enuf. Caught couple of his American Thinkers. You have any specific recommendations?

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Now, now Mata.

Mike and I were fishing for us some Oscar and you had to come along and stir up the water with those darned inconvenient facts.

Maybe Oscar, over in his very own special corner of Alternate Reality, will be able to produce some sort of proof for his claims but I won’t hold my breath.

Mata, have you ever heard of Dave Gaubatz? Interesting fellow he is, and lots to contribute to this line of discussion too.

BTW, you a Brit? Ship some bangers, please.

He may or may not be a Brit but he lives in Atlanta, GA now, so probably has no bangers for you. He might be able to ship you something from the Varsity though.

He’s a big fan of Sen. Chambliss and Neal Boortz.

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Oscar sez:

Don’t you consider the IAEA report from March of 2003 (10 days before Bush declared war) to be evidence?

Also

There was compelling, multi-sourced information available to the President before the war, which indicated Iraq was not an urgent danger, yet he chose to ignore it. Dating back as far as 1997, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) appraisal of Iraq’s known nuclear program was that it was successfully dismantled.

Lawdy… like shooting fish in a barrel, this one is.

Let’s advance a year to the UNMOVIC May 2004 quarterly report, shall we? (That would be the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, in case you’re not in the know…)

6. The Commission’s experts are conducting an investigation in parallel with the
IAEA Iraq Nuclear Verification Office regarding the discovery of items from Iraq that are relevant to the mandates of UNMOVIC and IAEA at a scrapyard in the Netherlands. In particular, following a visit of IAEA to a scrapyard in Rotterdam to investigate increased radiation readings, it was discovered, through photographs taken at the time, that engines of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles were among the scrap (see figure below). They are the type of engines used in the Al Samoud 2 proscribed missile programme.

In addition, a number of items and equipment that may also be relevant to the UNMOVIC mandate were seen among the scrap. The existence of missile engines originating in Iraq among scrap in Europe may affect the accounting of proscribed engines known to have been in Iraq’s possession in March 2003 Both IAEA and UNMOVIC have kept the Security Council informed of this matter.

Well lookie that! Illegally possessed missiles, known to be in Saddam’s possession March 2003, and conveniently dumped in a Netherland scrap yard to avoid being found when OIF commenced. oops… That makes your purported evidence source… uh, what’s the word? WRONG!

Recent findings

7. While sites in Iraq were being monitored for updates through satellite imagery, it was detected that some sites subject to monitoring by UNMOVIC had been cleaned up and equipment and material had been removed from the sites (see figures A.4 and A.5 below). In other areas, whole buildings that had previously contained equipment and materials subject to monitoring had been completely dismantled. The work continues to cover all known sites in Iraq.

Oh no, say it ain’t SOOOO! You mean Saddam and pals moved something *other* than the palace patio furniture in all those convoys and “humanitarian” flights???

oops again… And I’ll bet your beloved media didn’t advise you of that little report, did they? Would make them look like the lazy fools they are.

Like I said, if you’d stay current instead of relying on dated, media propaganda, you might have something to contribute. And thank heavens you at least wrote that opinion instead of putting it as lyrics to someone else’s music. BTW, you a Brit? Ship some bangers, please.

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