Wes, See comment #13. With these “peace” agreements concerning people like Sadr, all one has to do is read the Koran to know they must be an armed peace.

Like or Dislike: 0  0

I’ll believe this when his militias disarm themselves. Until that time, they’re just another bunch of people to be disarmed (or taken out) by force. He’s a clever player; note how much good press he got for his “ceasefire,” which had the net effect of putting his opponents in our crosshairs for months.

Color me skeptical…

Like or Dislike: 0  0

I don’t see Sadr quitting. He is going into hiding to save his head and wait. When the time is right, he’ll come back out. Whether he comes back into the limelight as Ayatollah and attempts his rise that way or we elect a demorat who pulls out and Iraq becomes chaotic again, is yet to be seen.

One thing is for sure, as things stand at the moment, he’s toast if he stays in the picture. Either we will take him out or they will.

Like or Dislike: 0  0

Gregory,

I believe you are correct on all counts. Your 5th point bears mentioning. Sadr has much historical precedence for making a false peace. He needs look no farther than Mohammed’s false peace with the Jews of Mecca which he eventually betrayed and slaughtered said Jews. With Sadr, as with Sunni Whabbahists, one needs to remember that little story and always be on guard.

And you are correct, no one in the Arab, Turk, or Persian world likes a loser. Sadr and increasingly UBL are seen as losers and crazy dictator wannabes happy to kill and oppress anyone (infidel or not) to get their way. That does not play well on the ‘street’.

Like or Dislike: 0  0

Excellent comments all. MataHarley though is certainly right in that Sadr isn’t out. I too have heard that he’s returning to seminary to study. Obtaining Ayatollah will give him authority, but it may be too late by then.

Here’s something else from the WSJ article that I found interesting:

“In 2007, the U.S. military shifted approach, putting in place for the first time a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy backed by a surge of troops to support it. The new strategy paid large dividends against al Qaeda and Sunni insurgents, as attacks dropped to 2005 levels and Iraqi deaths due to ethno-sectarian violence declined 90% from June 2007 to March 2008. As Sunni attacks against Shiite civilians declined, so did the rationale for Sadr’s authority.”

We have David Petraeus to thank for that. From late 2005 through 2006 he led the team that produced FM 3-24, the US Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. It was published in Dec of 2006, and is now the “bible” for our troops in Iraq.

Like or Dislike: 0  0

I’ve always suspected Sadr to be a double-agent.

Like or Dislike: 0  0

How embarrassing it must be to be grouped with these losers.
“Anti-war Democrat Harry Reid says the war is lost
Anti-war Democrat Nancy Pelosi says Iraq’s not even a war, but a situation to be “solved”
pseudo-anti-war Democrat Hillary Clinton says the war cannot be won”

Like or Dislike: 0  0

No, wouldn’t count him out but he gained power when the country was in complete and utter chaos….now that Iraqis can see things improving they have no need for his constant appeals for violence. They understand the coalition is not a occupying force now and thus, understand that in time they will have a country to call their own without Sadr’s help.

To answer you question Scott, it was Bush’s resolve to see that the country didn’t turn into something Sadr was hoping for….Another Iran.

Like or Dislike: 0  0

I’m going to put in a two cents worth via Ray Robison’s book, Both in One Trench, which addresses Sadr’s reasoning for rise and questionable status with some detail.

Sadr had lineage from his father and some local support, but no theocratic sanction. This is similar to OBL less status, i.e.no religious authority to issue fatwas. Thus some of the bonds and mergers in order to be granted that authority.

Sadr, being the ambitious jihadist he is, wanted leap frog to power in Iraq, and saw the US entry as being a way to do so. Or as Robison put it:

Power-hungry Sadr needed a religious coup within the midst of a coup d’état. That was his only chance to immediate power. To rise to power, he needed to eliminate all of the leading Shi’a clerics and drive out the coalition forces, which is exactly what the Ba’athists needed as well:

Needless to say, with The Awakening movement thwarting his coup d’etat, plus Sadr’s previous assassinations of clerics (eliminating as much of the the chain above him as possible) did not result in his ascent to power.

In Dec 2007, Sadr announced he was returning to the seminary to obtain status of an Ayatollah, and get the necessary degrees required for Shi’a doctrines. He is doing this specifically to gain the religious status needed for his desired credibility…. both outside Sadr City, and across the region.

Thus, I would not count him out, nor defeated. He has not, nor will, lay down arms. We just need to consider him temporarily waylaid while he follows a more traditional path to power via education. However he has lineage that will prove invaluable, even if he does not attain the highest religious authority.

Like or Dislike: 0  0

1. There is probably a priority list within the U.S. military. Al Qaeda is number one and Moqtada al-Sadr plus his followers are number two on the list. Since Iraq’s military is in mop up mode against Al Qaeda, it would be just weeks before Moqtada al-Sadr was targeted. He knew this and quit while he still had his head.

2. He might not have been loved by the Iraqis. Sure he has some followers, but unlike the U.S., the Iraqis basically know his movements. A key part of being an insurgency is blending in with the crowd. If the crowd sees and wants to kill the insurgency, the insurgency is doomed.

3. He might be militarly weak. His top aids, weapons caches and bomb factories have been hit. Maybe his contact with Iran has also been severed.

4. Since he went into hiding maybe any commanders he had left are now controlling the message on the ground. Arabs don’t stand behind cowards. Leaders face the enemy, they don’t go to safe houses. Like Osama bin Laden, hiding has undermined his power.

5. He is diverting his attackers so he can gain strength and attack later. It’s the old parabale where the potential victem tells the prey that he is too scrawny to eat.

Like or Dislike: 0  0